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This thesis addresses the topic of German espionage in
the United States between 1935 and 1945.

It examines what

the expectations were for Germany's spies in America, their
activities, and the success or failure of their operations.
In addition, the reaction of the American public to these
spies is also studied, as well as the response to what was
perceived as a threat to the United States from Nazi
Germany.
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Research on this subject reveals that there were a
number of German espionage agents involved in several
different spy rings operating in the United States before
Pearl Harbor.

Information obtained by these individuals

primarily concerned the transportation of war materials to
the Allies, and America's industrial and military
production.

Much of the information sent to Germany was not

of a highly classified nature and could be found in
technical journals and publications, through verbal
affirmation and visual sightings.

Most of these individuals

were arrested in the summer of 1941.
During the war years, German military intelligence
attempted two separate missions involving three different
landings of agents from submarines on America's Atlantic
shores.

All of these agents, a total of ten, were caught by

the FBI before any spying or act of sabotage could be
accomplished.
The available information and source data reveals that
German espionage operations in America were replete with
mistakes, bad organization, involved poor agent selection,
and ultimately fulfilled few of the expectations of the
Third Reich's spymasters.

However, the beliefs held by many

Americans concerning German spies and their operations,
contradict what is seen now as the overall failure of German
spying in the United States.

This was due in part to the

media--newspapers, magazines, nonfiction books, popular
fiction, and Hollywood movies--which exaggerated and
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sensationalized the danger presented by Nazi espionage
agents in America.

For much of America, the media

reinforced an image of the insidious but resourceful Nazi
spy, and suggested accomplishments far exceeding their
actual performance and success.

Thus there was a great

difference between what many American's believed, and the
true achievements of German agents and their operations in
the United States.
Primary sources valuable in the production of this
paper include the volumes of Documents on German Foreign
Policy, statements pertaining to individual agents, spy
rings and sabotage operations furnished by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, and the vast microfilm collection
of German records seized following the end of World War II
held by the National Archives.

Also used were personal

memoirs, information compiled and released by the U.S.
Navy's Office of Naval Intelligence, the volumes of The
Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International
Military Tribunal, and the 1938-1945 volumes of Foreign
Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers.
Important secondary sources include what proved to be
the invaluable contemporary works written between 1935 and
1945 about the German espionage menace in America.

These

included not only nonfiction books, but magazine articles
and news items from the New York Times.

Also very useful

were Heinz Hohne's excellent biography of Wilhelm Canaris,
David Kahn's well-researched book on German military

--,
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intelligence in World War II, and Ladislas Farago's The
Game of Foxes.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Following World War I, the United States emerged as
one of the great powers of the world.

America's assistance

to the Allies exemplified its capability in war.

It also

revealed the strength of the country's industrial capacity,
which was certain to give it a decisive edge in future
conflicts.

Military intelligence operations--the gathering

of sensitive information concerning the condition,
resources, and plans of other countries--had long played a
crucial role in the victory or defeat of nations.

Because

of its increased status and developed power, post-World War
I America tempted many as a lucrative espionage target,
particularly the military intelligence agents of Germany.
Germany was at the end of the power scale from the
United States.

Having lost the war in 1918, it was at the

mercy of what many Germans viewed as an extremely punitive
peace treaty engineered by the victors.

The Treaty of

Versailles assigned Germany responsibility for the war, and
for all the civilian losses and damage suffered by the
victorious Allies.

According to terms of the Treaty,

Germany was to make monetary compensation for all the damage
it had done, and was also required to forfeit to the Allies,
large amounts of goods, including steel, coal, and timber.
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Its army and navy were limited to no more than token forces.
The military air force was eliminated entirely.

The

manufacture of most offensive military weapons and equipment
was forbidden.

The Allies had refused to negotiate a peace

settlement with the German military or the monarchy, except
to demand unconditional surrender if these forces were not
removed from power.

In Germany, war-weary citizens

demonstrated, demanding peace.

Revolution erupted,

culminating in the Kaiser's abdication and the declaration
of a German Republic by the majority Socialist party.

The

German people had little experience or understanding of this
democratic form of government, and most of the country's
citizens disliked and distrusted the new Republic.

Quite on

purpose, Germany was reduced in power and authority by the
Treaty and the victorious Allies.
This enforced reduction in status was difficult for
many Germans to accept.

The country's military leaders were

particularly indignant.

They formulated plans to evade the

disarmament terms of the Versailles Treaty by secretly
rearming and rebuilding Germany's military forces.
Inevitably these plans led Germany's military intelligence
organization to the United States.

There its agents worked

to gather information, designs, and samples to aid
clandestine rearmament and buildup of the then illegal
German air force.
By 1933, the National Socialists were in power in
Germany and the fiction of disarmament was cast aside.

In
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1935, Admiral Wilhelm Canaris was appointed head of
Germany's military espionage and counterespionage
organization--the "Amt Ausland/Abwehr"--and found a small
cadre of agents already employed in the United States on
behalf of the Abwehr.

Ten years later, the Abwehr was

essentially absorbed into the
"Reichssicherheitshauptamt"--the Central State Security
Bureau of the Nazi Party--or RSHA.

Between Canaris'

appointment and the fall of the Third Reich in 1945, German
intelligence infiltrated the United States with additional
agents and landed saboteurs on America's Atlantic shores.
The effectiveness of these agents fluctuated widely
between success and failure.

But, irrespective of concrete

results, Germany's intelligence agents and their espionage
activities in the United States had a significant effect on
America and its citizens.

Public response to the specter of

enemy agents was rarely dependent on what their work in
America had actually produced.

Instead, the reaction of

many Americans was dictated by what they believed was the
purpose and intention of Nazi spies in the United States.
These beliefs, encouraged by the federal government, and
enlarged on by the media,

translated into an almost

irrational fear of covert activities fostered by the "evil"
Third Reich.
Consequently, there emerge two important questions
regarding German espionage activities in the United States
between 1935 and 1945.

First, what did the intelligence
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agencies of Germany--the Abwehr and the RSHA--expect from
their agents in the United States, and what was ultimately
accomplished by these agents?

Second, were the fears of

Americans about German spies in the United States and the
results produced by these spies contradictory?

It may be,

in the final analysis, that the effectiveness of Germany's
espionage agents and the overall success or failure of
German intelligence in the United States was of less
consequence than what Americans believed.

CHAPTER II
THE STRUCTURE OF THE AMT/AUSLAND ABWEHR
The German military intelligence system, which had
operated since the days of Frederick the Great, was
dismantled after Germany's defeat in World War I.
it was almost immediately resurrected.

However,

The purpose of this

intelligence service was ostensibly to combat leftist
extremism and revolution within the new and unsteady Weimar
Republic, and to counter attempts of foreign interference in
German governmental operations.

The clandestine aim of this

revived intelligence group was to aid Germany in
circumventing portions of the Versailles Treaty restricting
foreign intelligence operations.

The title of the new

intelligence and reconnaissance service was "Abwehr" from
the verb "abwehren," which means literally "to ward off or
defend," a designation intended to camouflage the real
purpose of the Abwehr--to spy for Germany.
Captain Wilhelm Canaris became the head of the Abwehr
on January 1, 1935.

Canaris was forty-eight years old when

he took over the Abwehr.

A career navy man, he entered the

Imperial Naval Academy in 1905.

He served on the light

cruiser "Dresden" in World War I, until the ship was
scuttled near Chile in 1915.

Canaris first became involved

in intelligence work in 1916, operating in Spain as an
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espionage director, choosing agents for assignments.

He

supported right-wing elements in the 1920's, and had no real
loyalty to republicanism and the Weimar Republic.

Canaris

alternated duty on land and sea, rising to command the
battleship "Schlesien" in 1932.

However, in late 1934,

Canaris received the dead-end appointment as commander of
the naval station at Swinemlinde, where he was supposed to
serve out his days until retirement. (1)
It was Conrad Patzig, appointed head of the Abwehr in
1932, who recommended Canaris as his replacement.

Patzig

was fired, primarily because of his differences with
Reinhard Heydrich, Heinrich Himmler, and the Nazi Party's
security agency, which tended to encroach on spheres of
operation assigned to the Abwehr.

Patzig suggested Canaris'

name to Admiral Raeder, and Raeder nominated him for the
position in late 1934.

Canaris was thought to be capable of

handling the antagonism of the rival intelligence
organization of the Nazi Party, the "Sicherheitsdienst des
Reichsfilhrers-SS," or SD, under Reinhard Heydrich.
Heydrich, a former naval officer, had served under Canaris
when both men had been assigned duty on the cruiser
"Berlin," and the two men maintained an outwardly friendly
relationship until Heydrich's death in 1943.

Heydrich was

interested in expanding his own power base and wanted all
intelligence services in the Third Reich to be put under his
command.

His SD was primarily concerned with political

espionage and internal security, while the Abwehr was
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responsible for military intelligence and counterespionage.
However, divisions between the two were often unclear, and
competition and duplication were inevitable.

The SD

consistently attempted to interfere with the Abwehr's area
of control, but Canaris was able to hold off Heydrich, and
for a time maintained the Abwehr as an independent agency of
the military outside the Party's jurisdiction.
Following his appointment as chief of the Abwehr,
Canaris restructured and enlarged the agency.

By 1939, what

had been a six-department organization when Canaris took
over in 1935 had been consolidated and centralized into
three major operational groups; espionage, sabotage and
counterespionage.

In addition, the organization included a

foreign information division and a central branch.

Known

collectively as the "Amt/Ausland Abwehr," by October, 1939,
Canaris' intelligence service was the military's central
agency for espionage, sabotage, and counterespionage, with
all the powers of a full department of the "Oberkommando der
Wehrmacht"--Armed Forces High Command--or OKW. (2)
As the Abwehr grew, Canaris found it increasingly
difficult to supervise his intelligence organization.

He

was not interested in the bureaucratic paperwork necessary
to run the Abwehr, and it was hard for him to delegate
responsibility.(3)

He preferred visiting the Abwehr field

stations, where he could feel a part of the actual
intelligence operations.

To the consternation of his field

commanders, he often issued instructions contradicting their

I
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basic policies, almost assuring chaotic upheaval at each of
his visits. (4)
Canaris eagerly and personally sought new recruits for
the Abwehr, often choosing them for their availability
rather than their talent for intelligence work.

His

personal choices included military men, civilians,
monarchists, vehement anti-Nazis, and avowed National
Socialists.

Many of Canaris' new recruits lacked the

necessary experience to do their jobs effectively, and
in-house training was limited. (5)
In part due to Canaris' poor personnel selection and
his bad management skills, the Abwehr lacked political
cohesiveness and needed a foundation of internal guidelines
to insure and maintain quality.

Inefficiency among

personnel was never really controlled.

While this may not

have been detrimental in Canaris' early years with the
Abwehr, it took its toll later when ill-thought-out
intelligence operations marked by confusion, overlapping
targets, and misinformation became more and more frequent.
Abwehr I was the espionage division and the
coordinating head for espionage activity in the field.

Its

function was to collect information of military value to the
Third Reich.

It had sections that dealt specifically with

naval, army, air force, and economic intelligence. (6)
Abwehr II handled sabotage in enemy territory, infiltration,
and subversion.
security.

Abwehr III dealt with counterespionage and

The "Ausland" branch was the foreign liaison
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division, and it preserved contact between the OKW and the
Foreign Office.

It evaluated information from the foreign

press and kept the OKW apprised of developments in Germany's
foreign policy and of the domestic and foreign affairs of
other countries as far as they affected the military
situation. (7)

A Central Group was also formed by Canaris

within the Abwehr.

The "Zentralabteilung" was the

administrative division which handled personnel records and
finances.

It also kept the agent information files and the

central index of agents. (8)
All military espionage operations were the
responsibility of Abwehr I.

Its operative sections were

broken into geographical divisions, each dealing with a
particular country or area.

Within the zone of German

military jurisdiction--that is, Germany and its occupied
territories--Abwehr I was the coordinating force behind
Abwehr field offices known as "Abwehrstellen" or "Asts."(9)
However, Abwehr I usually did not direct the day-to-day
operations of the field units, nor did it evaluate incoming
intelligence.

Information was routed to the office which

had requested it, or to the agency which held
jurisdiction. (10)
These major intelligence centers had subposts
designated "Abwehrnebenstellen," which were augmented by
intelligence outposts known as "Abwehraussenstellen."(11)
The field units, in conjunction with Abwehr headquarters,
were responsible for all aspects of military espionage,
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including the recruitment, training, and assigning of
espionage agents.

Theoretically, individual agents

recruited by a particular "Ast" were sent to the country or
area for which the "Ast" or its subpost were responsible.
For example, agents enlisted by "Abwehrstelle" Hamburg or
its subpost "Nebenstelle" Bremen were, in theory,
responsible for espionage against the United States. (12)
The "Asts" maintained divisions corresponding to the foreign
territories they operated in.

But these geographic

assignments were not strictly observed.

Several

"Abwehrstellen" might send agents to the same place, while
others might not have dispatched any agents at all.

These

factors contributed to the inefficiency of the operation and
of the organization.
In neutral countries or those allied with Germany, the
Abwehr station was referred to as a "Kriegsorganisation" or
KO.

Generally, the KOs operated out of the individual

German embassies or consulates, usually with some form of
diplomatic immunity. (13)

The country in which the KO was

located served as a base for its various agents' operations
and as a communications link for agents abroad.

KO Spain,

for instance, transmitted reports from its agents in Great
Britain and Washington, D.C. to Abwehr headquarters in
Germany. (14)
As in the case of the "Asts," espionage activity in an
area monitored by a specific KO was sometimes jeopardized
because of duplication and the lack of a centralized policy.
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Because of this confusion, apparently inherent in the
overall Abwehr organization, work of the KOs often suffered.
KOs did not have exclusive responsibility for espionage
activity in their individual territory, thus interference
between agents from different "Asts" or KOs was
frequent. (15)

Lack of communication and mismanagement of

Abwehr operations and personnel caused overlapping of target
choices and duplication of collected information.
The structure of both the "Asts" and the KOs
corresponded to that of Abwehr headquarters; each had
sections for espionage, sabotage, and counterespionage, as
well as for the various geographical and technical
subdivisions.

The existence and survival of the

"Abwehrstellen" and KOs was largely dependent upon Germany's
political and military success.

Military gains or losses

meant the addition or loss of an "Ast" or its subpost.
Neutral countries and German allies were more tolerant of
the KOs as long as Germany remained a major power to be
feared.

Indeed, it seemed the major criticism of the Kos

came from members of the German Foreign Missions, who
complained over the large number of Abwehr personnel with
diplomatic passports who worked out of the consulates and
jeopardized work of the genuine diplomats.

KOs were not

required to inform the consulates of incoming Abwehr
personnel, their local formation, or operations and
information gathered. (16)

However, when the war began to go

badly for Germany, the Allied victories encouraged those
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neutral countries with German diplomatic missions to expel
Abwehr personnel working under diplomatic immunity.
The agent network was under the direction of Abwehr I,
which dispatched agents on intelligence missions through its
"Asts" or Kos.

The agents were divided into categories

designated by letters which signified their position in the
Abwehr.

An agent employed in peacetime was known as an

"Friedensagent" or F-agent.

Generally, F-agents watched

over military movements and the defense capabilities of the
country in which they were stationed, and also gathered
technical, political, economic, and scientific information
not readily available to Germany.

"Spannungsagenten" or

S-agents were those who worked in times of international
crisis or political tension.
of military movement.

They watched for an increase

Wartime agents, "Kriegsagenten,"

designated as A-agents, worked behind enemy lines during
actual hostilities.

A "Reiseagent" was an Abwehr scout or

mobile informant, and was designated as an R-agent. (17)
Others were known as

"V-M~nner"

or

"Vertrauensm~nner",

confidence men or trusted persons.
A second category of agents, not directly employed by
the Abwehr, operated under code-names.

"Tramp," "Crown,"

and "Sex" are examples of code-names used by German agents
in the United States.

Code-name agents worked through

either a "V-Mann" or a KO, and submitted their intelligence
reports directly to these contacts.

Sometimes they were

employed, through their supervisor, as wireless operators
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for groups of agents in foreign countries. (18)
"Hinterminner" or "Unter-V-Minner" served as subagents
and contact persons.

The Abwehr had no direct dealings with

these individuals, as they acted only as informers or
couriers for certain Abwehr agents, sometimes unaware that
they served as information sources for spies. (19)
Agent recruitment and information resources for the
Abwehr were greatly varied.

In Germany, many organizations

and individuals were enlisted, often with mixed results,
since the division of responsibility between the government,
party, and private organizations was frequently vague.

The

Abwehr utilized any means available in its effort to aid
Germany in the intelligence contest.

Military and naval

personnel, diplomatic missions, trade delegations, and
scientific institutes, which shared industry secrets, were a
part of the Abwehr's network.

Additionally, organizations

such as the "Deutsches Ausland-Institut," which connected
German emigrants and those of German heritage with the
Fatherland, and the Nazi party's "Auslandsorganisation" for
party members abroad, were also used, sometimes without the
knowledge of these organizations.

In addition, there were

free-lance agents who operated independently and offered
themselves to the Abwehr in the hopes of selling whatever
they could obtain.

There were also those whom Abwehr

personnel approached and convinced through coercion,
blackmail, or patriotism to act as spies.
The United States was an unwitting host to many of
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these individuals.

Some were actively involved as Abwehr

agents; others knowingly acted as intelligence sources.

A

third group innocently provided information to the Abwehr,
often through institutions without apparent espionage ties.
Although America attempted to maintain itself apart
from the rest of the world's preoccupation with Hitler and
National Socialism, its protective shell was cracked early
in 1938 with the arrest of a man accused of passing
information to the Germans.

His apprehension resulted in

the first Nazi spy trial in the United States.

This first

arrest, and others that followed soon after, awakened
Americans to their vulnerability to forces abroad.

The

gravity of National Socialism in Europe and German espionage
in America became more than a subject for discussion and
unsubstantiated fears; it acquired sudden tangibility and a
frightening reality.

Germany had embarked on an aggressive

espionage program; its threats were genuine.

Americans

found themselves vulnerable and subject to doubts concerning
their country's defense.

It seemed that rather abruptly the

United States had been drawn into Nazi Germany's
ever-widening circle of interest, as a military target for
its intelligence agents.
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CHAPTER Ill
THE CRACK IN THE WALL:
AMERICAN ISOLATIONISM AND THE FIRST NAZI SPY TRIAL
After 1918, the United States retreated from its
involvement with other nations and returned to its national
policy of isolationism.

Although America had been a

latecomer to the war, its money, supplies, and manpower were
decisive factors in the Allied victory.

The United States

emerged a world power, and a nation to which much of the
world owed a large financial debt.

However, many Americans

were disillusioned, saddled as they were with inflation,
influenza, and war debts their former allies were very vocal
about not wanting to repay.

Having fought to "save

democracy" in the "war to end all wars," Americans were left
with a world that was neither entirely democratic nor
without conflict.

Americans, bitter over what was seen as a

senseless war and disgusted with their Allies' postwar
attitudes, reacted by turning their backs on Europe and
European problems.
But isolationism in America turned into an illness.
The symptoms were clear: fearing the country would be
beseiged by hordes of people escaping the aftermath of war,
Congress passed the restrictionist immigration laws of 1921
and 1924, which greatly reduced the number of immigrants
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allowed into the United States.

America refused to adhere

to the Treaty of Versailles, preferring to make separate
peace treaties with Germany and its allies, primarily to
avoid joining the League of Nations.

The League was seen as

a mechanism which would force Americans to deal with
Europe's problems and fight European battles.

The "Red

Scare" of 1919-1920 and the raids against Communists and
subversives in the United States were connected by some
Americans to the 1917 Russian Revolution and to fears of
spreading Communism.

But this witchhunt for Communists was

rooted in America's growing intolerance of foreigners and
"radicals."
While the United States rated itself a world power
following World War I, it shunned world leadership and
participation in world affairs in a tragically short-sighted
way.

America had cooperated in war but refused to commit

itself to postwar efforts to insure peace.

National

isolationism was strengthened throughout the 1920's by these
postwar attitudes.

American's greatest desire was to forget

the great crusade of the World War and the problems in
Europe, and return to the less complicated prewar days of
peace and comfort.
to "normalcy."

Warren G. Harding called this a return

For many others, this era of conservatism,

intolerance, and isolationism was remembered fondly as the
prosperous days of the "Roaring Twenties."
The advent of the Great Depression in late 1929
accentuated America's fear of foreigners and foreign
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entanglements and contributed to its restrictionism and
isolationism, as did the increased militarism in Europe and
Japan.

In his first inaugural address, Franklin D.

Roosevelt likened the Depression to a foreign invader, and
demanded " •.• broad Executive power to wage a war against the
emergency •••• "(1)

Cognizant of its domestic problems above

all else, the United States attempted to close ranks.

The

Depression fostered a mood of national despair and
confusion, marked by disappointment and disillusionment with
the state of world affairs.

Americans wanted only to stay

out of foreign wars, and at first saw no danger to
themselves from the belligerents across the Atlantic and the
Pacific.

Congress accepted the isolationist mood of the

country and, beginning in 1935, enacted a series of
Neutrality laws to keep the nation from becoming involved in
any war "over there."
However, public opinion in America was increasingly
offended by the domestic policies of the Nazis, which were
dominated by intense anti-Semitism.

In addition, Germany's

growing cooperation with Italy and Japan--indicated by
mutual adherence to the Anti-Comintern Pact and the
Tripartite Pact--alarmed many Americans, who feared an
international conspiracy against democracy.

Of the three

nations that threatened world peace and security, Nazi
Germany was the most violent in its hatreds and the most
powerful in the resources and technology of modern war.
Consequently, it seemed the most dangerous to the United
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States.
Aggressive rhetoric emerging from Germany seemed to
confirm this view, as did the growth of fascist-related
organizations in the United States.

The Friends of the New

Germany preceded the German-American Bund, whose members
openly wore a Nazi style uniform complete with swastika
emblems.

William Pelley's Silver Shirts, even Father

Charles Coughlin's Social Justice Movement, and the
revivified Ku Klux Klan, which sported an ideological
alliance with the Bund, were the purveyors of a strain of
violently abusive propaganda that at once vilified the
"enemies" of the new Germany and lauded the National
Socialist state. (2)

This type of endorsement of the Third

Reich generated fear in the minds of some Americans about
the importation of National Socialist ideals and of Nazi
subversion in America thought to be financed from Germany.
Feelings against Germany were strong as early as June of
1935, when the German ambassador to the United States
reported to Berlin that anti-German propaganda had increased
and that America had become "one of the main centers of
anti-German agitation."{3)
News of the capture of the first German spies since
World War I broke across the United States in February,
1938, in a wave of publicity.

The reputed size and range of

the Nazi espionage ring in America shocked many.

Even more

startling was the discovery of the apparent ease with which
these agents had operated, the majority without any

21
professional training.
Guenther Gustav Rumrich brought about the unmasking of
this particular group.

A naturalized American of German

birth, an unmitigated failure in civilian life, and a
deserter from the United States army, Rumrich found his
niche after reading the memoirs of Colonel Walter Nicolai,
who had headed German military intelligence during World War
I. (4)

In January, 1936, Rumrich wrote to Nicolai in care of

the Nazi Party newspaper, the Volkischer Beobachter.

He

volunteered himself as a spy for Germany, stating that if
the Germans could use his services, they should insert an
advertisement in the New York Times addressed to "Theodor
Koerner."(5)

Nicolai forwarded the letter to the head of

Abwehr I, Colonel Hans Piekenbrock, who in turn gave it to
the Hamburg branch which acted on Rumrich's proposal.

On

April 6, 1936, the New York Times contained an
advertisement which read: "Theodor Koerner-Letter received,
please send reply and address to Sanders, Hamburg 1, Postbox
629, Germany."(6)
Rumrich was enlisted as a spy and worked under the
direction of Dr. Erich Pfeiffer of the Hamburg branch of the
Abwehr.

Rumrich's small group had the cover name of "Crown"

and operated in conjunction with a larger ring codenamed
"Ilberg."(7)

"Crown" operated for approximately twenty

months, during which time Rumrich was able to gather various
bits of information, such as the number of cases of VD in
the United States Army and the signal code the army used in
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ship-to-shore communications.

He sent the information back

to Pfeiffer by way of Karl Schlueter, Abwehr courier and a
steward on the German ocean liner "Europa."(8)
Much of the mail sent to Germany by the spy ring in
the United States first went to a mail drop in Scotland,
where the letters were routed on to the Abwehr. (9)

The

mailman delivering to the drop, a beauty parlor in Dundee
owned by a woman named Jessie Jordan, noticed the large
quantity of foreign mail and reported it to British
counterintelligence.

Since many of the suspicious letters

were sent from New York, the British notified the FBI, which
found upon reading the mail, evidence of the "Crown"
operation in New York. (10)
At the same time, Rumrich had been asked by Pfeiffer
to get a number of blank American passports for Nazi agents
abroad, and had been promised $1000 for the delivery.
Unfortunately, Rumrich did not understand the difference
between blank passports and passport blanks, the latter
merely the form used when applying for a passport.
Pretending to be "Edward Weston, Undersecretary of State,"
Rumrich called the New York branch of the passport division
and demanded that 50 passport blanks be sent to him at his
hotel. (11)
Because the request was so contrary to procedure,
because no one knew an Under Secretary of State named Edward
Weston, and because passport blanks were available to anyone
who wanted them, the clerks notified Federal authorities,
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who prepared a fake package for "Mr. Weston."

What followed

next was a comedy of hide-and-seek, with Rumrich rerouting
the package by telephone and the Alien Squad of the New York
police department tailing after.

Rumrich was finally

arrested on February 15, 1938, and was turned over to the
FBI where he faced evidence the FBI had amassed concerning
activities of the "Crown" ring. (12)
Rumrich not only confessed to his own position in the
"Crown" ring, but turned state's evidence and implicated
others, including those agents he knew who were involved in
"Ilberg."

The ramifications of Rumrich's arrest and

confession were significant in that he exposed the
activities of agents who had since left the country.
"Ilberg" and its predecessor "Sex" had had long and
successful operating careers prior to the confession of
Rumrich, dating back to 1927, when the first agent of "Sex"
entered the United States. (13)
"Sex" was an abbreviation of an alias, "William
Sexton," one of many used by William Lonkowski.

Lonkowski

joined the Abwehr shortly after the first World War.
Because of his background in aviation he was sent to the
United States in the late twenties to gather intelligence
for the German airforce, which was forming secretly.
Lonkowski and two co-agents worked in the American air
industry under this operative code name. (14)

In the late

twenties and early thirties Lonkowski and his two
confederates, Werner Georg Gudenberg and Otto Voss, were
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able to send the Abwehr aircraft secrets copied and stolen
from the various plants where they had worked.

These

included the Curtiss Aircraft plant in New York, which at
the time, was producing equipment for the government.
In 1934, Lonkowski merged his ring with that of Dr.
Ignatz Griebl, who used the codename "Ilberg."

Griebl had

come to the United States after World War I, where he set up
a physician's practice in New York and became an American
citizen.

Like Guenther Rumrich, Griebl volunteered his

services as an espionage agent through a letter, in this
case to the Nazi Propaganda Minister, Joseph Goebbels. {15)
In order to recruit suitable individuals to help him,
Griebl involved himself in the Friends of the New Germany,
the organization which preceded the German-American Bund,
through which William Lonkowski heard of Griebl's
activities. The two joined forces, using Lonkowski's friends
and the courier system developed by Griebl, which utilized
the German ocean liners of the Hamburg-American and North
German Lloyd lines and selected crew members as a
transmission service to and from Germany. (16)

In addition,

they acquired contacts at American defense installations and
manufacturing plants, and over an extended period of time,
were successful in obtaining military information for the
Abwehr.

Their intelligence coups included: obtaining

specifications from the Sikorsky plant at Farmingdale, Long
Island, of pursuit planes reputed to be the fastest in the
world; plans for a navy scout bomber being built by Vought
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Aviation; bombers being developed by Boeing and Douglas;
blueprints of three destroyers; drawings for a new
anti-aircraft gun and for an experimental army plane for
night bombing; and classified U.S. Army maps. (17)

All

information was sent by way of courier to Pfeiff er in
Germany.
It was on one of his deliveries to the courier on
board the "Europa" in September, 1935, that Lonkowski was
stopped and searched by U.S. customs guards.

His pockets

and the violin case he was carrying were found to contain
documents, drawings of planes, and film negatives which
detailed an airplane that turned out to be a new Curtiss
light bomber. (18)

Lonkowski was questioned and, oddly

enough, released with instructions to return the next
morning for further interrogation.

With Griebl's help,

Lonkowski escaped across the Canadian border and from there
boarded a German freighter that returned him to Germany.
Why Lonkowski was allowed to leave remains unclear,
unless the importance of the documents and films he was
concealing was not immediately recognized, though American
intelligence personnel had been called in to examine the
material.

What is certain is that American officials

exhibited a high degree of naivete in this incident.

Aside

from his name and the information he was carrying, Lonkowski
yielded nothing in questioning.

In fact his position, the

success of "Operation Sex," and his escape were never fully
revealed or understood until Guenther Rumrich became the key
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witness for the Federal prosecution in the spy trial of
October, 1938.

"Operation Sex," renamed "Operation Ilberg,"

had been able to operate for almost three more years without
interruption from American authorities.
In June, 1938, following Rumrich's arrest and the
grand jury hearings, eighteen individuals were charged by
Federal indictment with having conspired to violate American
espionage laws.

The Federal authorities took the almost

unprecedented step of naming all those indicted as agents of
the German government.

The New York Times reported on

June 21:
... Germany was officially named as the party
responsible for the under-cover force that
aggressively sought to pry out the best technical
military defense secrets of the United States. (19)
However, only four faced trial on October 14, 1938,
and were subsequently convicted.

Otto Voss, Lonkowski's

aide who worked at the Sikorsky aircraft plant, received a
six year sentence, and Johanna Hofmann, who had worked as a
hairdresser and courier on the "Europa," got four years.
For his theft of the Army's ship-to-shore communications
code, Erich Glaser, a private in the Eighteenth
Reconnaissance Squadron stationed at Mitchell Field, Long
Island, received a two year sentence.

Gustav Rurnrich

pleaded guilty to the indictment of espionage and was also
sentenced to two years. (20)
The others named in the Federal indictment had either
escaped the United States or had never left Germany.

Karl
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Schlueter was exposed as a courier, but escaped arrest.

Dr.

Ignatz Griebl and Werner Gudenberg had been recruited by the
FBI as witnesses following Rumrich's arrest, and both
testified for the Federal Grand Jury in May, 1938, before
the indictments were handed down in June.

Though Rumrich's

earliest admissions had identified them as part of the Nazi
espionage ring, they seemed willing enough to testify and
were neither bonded nor guarded by the FBI.

They eluded

trial by returning to Germany on the ships which had served
the couriers, supposedly with neither ticket nor
passport. (21)

An attempt to arrest Griebl when the "Bremen"

made its first stop in France was foiled by the Captain who
refused to give up Griebl to the French police. (22)

Erich

Pfeiffer, who directed the spies in America for the Abwehr,
was indicted "in absentia."(23)
1938 proved to be a landmark year in terms of
German-American relations: it marked the beginning of a
steady erosion of isolationist convictions within the United
States and culminated in the recall of the German and
American ambassadors from their respective posts.

Guenther

Rumrich's arrest in February, the federal indictments of
eighteen Nazi spies in June, and the spy trial in October
were seen by Americans in light of a series of
Nazi-initiated European crises.

These included the

annexation of Austria in March, the threat to Czechoslovakia
in the summer of 1938, and the attacks on Jewish life and
property during the "Kristallnacht" pogrom in November.
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These events all served to increase American anxiety and
hostility toward Germany's aggressive internal and external
policies.
Relations between the two countries deteriorated to
such an extent in 1938 that German Ambassador Dieckhoff
wrote in November to the Foreign Ministry of a " .•. storm of
anti-German feeling sweeping America."(24)

Similarly,

before his recall, American Ambassador Hugh Wilson described
the Nazi-backed attacks on Jews in Germany, and stated,
" .•• these pogroms dispel any hope of moderation in
German-American relations."(25)
German diplomats in the United States were under no
illusions that Germany could count on America's isolationist
sentiment in all circumstances; indeed, the events of 1938
led many Americans to view world developments as an
ideological struggle between democracy and dictatorship--a
conflict between good and evil.

In the minds of some

Americans, the Nazis became the subverters of peace, truth,
and virtue.

The discovery of Nazi spies in America was seen

as a personal attack on the nation and a conspiracy designed
to undermine the allegiance of naturalized German-Americans.
The Rumrich trial alerted the United States government
and the American public to the gravity of the German
espionage problem.

The three male defendants in the Rumrich

trial were naturalized American citizens, as were other
important members of the spy ring, including Griebl and
Gudenberg.

That these individuals had taken an oath of
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allegiance to the United States and had forsworn loyalty to
the country of their birth made their crimes all the more
treacherous.

Their betrayal seemed to give credence to the

fear that German-Americans were being manipulated by the
Third Reich, and that the international community of people
of German blood were part of Hitler's German "Volk," with
all of the obligations the term implied.

Though the average

American was more than a little confused about the
accomplishments and potential of German espionage in the
United States as revealed by the media during the Rumrich
trial, most were profoundly affected by the fact that
German-born American citizens had chosen to spy upon their
adopted country.
The spy trial of 1938 and the activities of pro-Nazi
groups such as the German-American Bund, which emphasized
its connection to the Third Reich, ran afoul of American
sensitivity toward organizations and individuals within the
United States that maintained ties to another country.

The

trial also contributed to the public's reaction against
National Socialism and reinforced popular suspicion of
foreigners.

This was partly because the information

Americans acquired concerning German espionage in the United
States was learned through media publicity--books,
magazines, and newspapers--some of which tended to
exaggerate and sensationalize the danger. (26)
Magazine articles that wrote of "Expanding Espionage"
and "Spy Scares" and asked, "Is America Infested With Nazi
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Spies?" could not help but influence their reading public as
to the magnitude of German spying in America. (27)

Books

such as Sabotage: How to Guard Against It, Armies of
Spies, Secret Agents Against America, Total Espionage,
and The Brown Network, all published in the United States
before Pearl Harbor, at times used embellishment and
allegation to capitalize on what was already known about
America as a target for German espionage agents. (28)
Americans were told that:
Before the United States started paying attention
to foreign agents, there were fifty thousand
individuals in this country who .•• contributed to
the stream of information whose end was in the Nazi
espionage centers in Berlin and Hamburg. (29)
It was also stated that the German diplomatic corps
had been organized into a fifth column unit staffed by
" •.. Nazi saboteur-diplomats ... " who began arriving in the
United States in 1933 and subsequently " •.• entangled the
forty-eight states in a web of secret destruction."(30)
Many of these public sources attributed the growth of
the Nazi spy system in the United States to the racial
doctrine of the Hitler government which claimed:
•.. every 'Aryan' born German abroad remains a
German regardless of whether he has sworn allegiance
to a foreign government or not. Germans abroad must
be at the disposal of the Reich and are obliged to
serve its interests. (31)
Thus the foreign born, irrespective of citizenship,
were labeled "aliens," and described as:
••. individuals of an aggressively foreign
character, wholly dissimilar from and unsympathetic
to the standards and political system that prevail
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in the United States. A different
allegiance--regardless of length of American
residence--psychological estrangement and downright
hostility are the characteristics of those who are
the alien agitators, conspirators and spies •••• (32)
Nativism and distrust of foreigners was not new in the
United States.

But these attitudes toward Germans and

German-Americans were strengthened in 1938 by Germany's
actions abroad and the Rumrich trial, and because of
associated published information Americans were reading and
what they came to believe about the threat of German spies.
Fears about Nazi espionage agents, and the
increasingly strong conviction that a vast Nazi fifth column
movement operated in the United States, led to restrictions
on immigrants from Germany and those refugees escaping
National Socialism.

Assuming that the Nazis only allowed

selected individuals to emigrate, many Americans, including
a number of State Department officials, felt that refugees
from Germany were part of a German fifth column movement
sent to threaten the security of the United States. (33)
Assistant Secretary of State Breckenridge Long, who was in
charge of the State Department's Visa section, and a number
of his subordinates believed there was a subversive element
among applicants for visas to America, and that many
refugees were fifth columnists in disguise. (34)

Long wrote

in his diary:
It is very apparent that the Germans are using
visitor's visas to send agents and documents through
the United States and are using their Consulates in
the United States as headquarters for their
nationals who enter on transit permits and who are
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carrying confidential documents •.•. (35)
The suspicion that spies were entering the United
States in the guise of refugees actually had very little
basis in fact.

The nation's immigration quota system and

the State Department's visa regulations were very tight.
Many of the American Consuls abroad whose responsibility it
was to issue visas felt it was also their responsibility to
keep the number issued down to a minimum. (36)

Ultimately

each "alien" was required to have two American sponsors, and
the sponsors were asked to submit loyalty or moral
affidavits. (37)

These actions were partially attributable

to the Rumrich trial and the developing fear of German
espionage in America.
Because German agents had indeed been arrested, there
was some obvious basis of fact for the fears the nation
harbored concerning naturalized German-Americans and a fifth
column in the United States sponsored by the Third Reich.
But German espionage was not as widespread as people seemed
ready to believe, nor was the United States the veritable
"paradise for spies" as was claimed in Total Espionage by
Curt Riess, a popular book of the period. (38)

Nevertheless,

following the 1938 arrest and indictment of German spies,
there was a demand for stronger and more adequate
anti-espionage defenses in the United States.
What passed for counterespionage action in the United
States had so far proven more of a liability than an asset
by the Rumrich case.

Certainly the FBI had done little to
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validate J. Edgar Hoover's claim that his men had "smashed"
the greatest German spy ring since the First World War; many
of the important members had escaped and others in America
and Germany remained untouched. (39)
This ineffective counter-spying was excused by the
implication that America's innate purity had kept it from
the tradition of warfare that required counterespionage
tactics:
Through many of our wars and most of the
prospering intervals of peace one might have hidden
all available American counter-spies behind a
telegraph pole. And this absolute lack has appeared
to be a special blessing, conferred on America by
the temperament of the nation •••. (40)
It was claimed that, prior to the threats on democracy
from Germany, Japan, and Italy, America had had no need of
an espionage or counterespionage system because:
The United States was not imperialistic; it had no
desire to make conquests and therefore was not
military. As for industrial espionage--America had
no need of it. No spy could learn from another
country anything that America did not already know.
American industry was further developed than the
industry of any other country. (41)
When sentencing the four convicted German spies in
late November, 1938, the presiding judge publicly chided the
FBI for its carelessness and ineptitude in letting members
of the spy ring escape. (42)

Shortly after the trial,

President Roosevelt announced that the need for a stronger
espionage force was to be served through the coordinated
forces of the FBI and army and navy intelligence. (43)
America's counterespionage facilities were to be improved
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and expanded in order to combat the intelligence threat to
the nation posed by Nazi Germany.
1938 was a shocking year that portended things to
come.

Hitler's Third Reich was beginning to alter the face

of Europe, and in America there was a gradual change in the
isolationist conviction that the United States could live as
an island unto itself.

The Rumrich trial and the publi~ty

that followed awakened the country to its vulnerability to
enemy agents, and steps were taken to tighten security.
However, what the FBI had uncovered with the aid of
Rumrich's testimony did not disturb the core of Abwehr
agents in the United States.

These agents were able to

operate, apparently unimpeded, for almost three more years.
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CHAPTER IV
ANATOMY OF A SPY NETWORK
In February, 1939, William G. Sebold, a naturalized
American of German birth, returned to Germany to visit his
family.

Sebold had left Germany after World War I, having

served in the Kaiser's army.

In the United States, he

worked in various industrial and airplane plants throughout
the country.

On disembarking his ship in Hamburg, Sebold

listed his occupation on the landing card as a mechanic with
the Consolidated Aircraft Company plant in San Diego,
California.

This information appealed to the Gestapo and

Sebold was invited to their Dilsseldorf office. (1)
When Sebold declined, the Gestapo officials revealed
that they knew of Sebold's past criminal record.

In his

youth, Sebold had spent time in German jails for smuggling
and other offenses.

Apparently Sebold had not revealed

these criminal activities to the American authorities when
applying for citizenship.

Threatened with reprisals against

his family, a concentration camp stay, divulgence of his
past sins, and perhaps the revocation of his American
citizenship, Sebold went to the Gestapo office where he
accepted an offer to work as a German spy. (2)
Sebold's case was forwarded by the Gestapo to the
"Abwehrstelle" in Hamburg, which was in charge of espionage
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against the United States.

The head of the air intelligence

sector at Hamburg, Major Nikolaus Ritter, was told by the
Gestapo that Sebold had "volunteered" to act as a spy and
had been thoroughly checked out.

The Gestapo recommended

he be hired by the Abwehr for work in America. (3)

It was

the policy of the Abwehr, as ordered by Admiral Canaris, not
to use pressure, threats, or blackmail in the recruitment of
agents.

The principle of such action was not questioned as

much as it simply was bad for public relations and would
limit enlistment.

The fact that the Abwehr took William

Sebold on as an agent shows how little the Reich agencies
communicated with one another.

The Gestapo's methods were

not those of the Abwehr, yet it was almost taken for granted
by Ritter that Sebold had volunteered, as the Gestapo
maintained, and that he would work diligently for Germany
despite his American citizenship.
It was arranged for Sebold to attend the spy school in
Hamburg where he was trained in the use of a Leica camera
and shown how to make microphotographic reductions of
documents.

He was taught how to use secret inks, Morse

telegraphy, codes, and the shortwave radio.(4)

Ritter

preferred using American citizens as radio operators; thus
Sebold's job in the United States would be to radio
intelligence gathered by other agents back to Germany, or
make microphotographs of documents for mailing to the
Abwehr.
Prior to his return to the United States,
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Sebold--codename "Tramp"--was supplied with a forged
American passport made out to "William Sawyer", $1000 in
American currency, and a list of four agents in New York
whose reports he was to forward to Germany.

They were:

Frederick Joubert Duquesne, Lilly Stein, Everett Roeder, and
Hermann Lang. (5)

Sebold met with each after his return to

America in early February, 1940.
Under instructions from his Abwehr contact, Major
Ritter, Sebold set up a front for his operations called the
"Diesel Research Company," and in a house on Long Island,
installed a shortwave radio with which he contacted Hamburg
with messages from agents. (6)

All communications were to be

sent in code, the key being a popular novel of the period,
All This and Heaven Too by Rachel Field. (7)
Sebold was an extremely conscientious radio operator,
and maintained almost daily communication with the Abwehr in
Germany.

Using the call letters CQDXVW-2, he sent out

prompt weather reports and was always up to date on ship
movements in and out of New York harbor. (8)

However, the

primary importance of Sebold and his radio lay in the speed
with which important information could be transmitted from
America to Germany.

Vital communications concerning ships,

their destinations and cargoes tolerated no delay,
particularly if the German U-boats wanted to plot intercept
coordinates.

All urgent messages from agents were

transmitted by radio, while less important or longer reports
went via courier.

Consequently, it was necessary to have a
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trained and reliable radio operator who could get the
intelligence out, and William Sebold was eminently
qualified.

In fact, his station functioned so dependably

that Major Ritter expanded the group for which Sebold
transmitted.

Agents who operated under other Abwehr

officers were allowed to use Sebold as their communications
channel. (9)

As a result, Sebold became acquainted with a

number of German agents working in the New York area.

As

did Sebold, many of them worked with the Duquesne ring,
while others operated independently or in conjunction with
other groups.
The importance of William Sebold cannot be stressed
enough, because unfortunately for the Abwehr, Sebold was the
key figure that brought down one of its largest spy rings
operating in America.

While Sebold was visiting his family

in Mulheim, and being pressured by the Gestapo in
Dusseldorf, he visited the American Consulate in Cologne,
ostensibly to send some money to a family member in the
United States. (10)

There he confided to consular officials

the attempt on the part of the Germans to blackmail him into
becoming a spy for the Abwehr and his wish to cooperate with
the American authorities in order to expose the German spy
organization in the United States. (11)

Thus Sebold appeared

to go along enthusiastically with the Abwehr's plans for him
in America, and did well at the Abwehr's spy school in
Hamburg.
When Sebold returned to the United States early in
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1940, State Department officials notified the FBI of the
deception, and from that time on Sebold worked with the FBI.
Between January, 1940, and June, 1941, when arrests were
made, all contacts between Sebold and his co-agents that
took place in Sebold's Diesel Research office were recorded
and filmed through one-way mirrors by the FBI.

Sebold's

radio station on Long Island was manned by a Federal agent
and all messages sent to the Abwehr were either screened for
dangerous information, or were sent intact and the plans or
facts behind the intelligence changed. (12)

For nearly

eighteen months William Sebold served as the communications
link for almost all of the American-based agents of the
Hamburg branch of the Abwehr, as well as for an assortment
of other agents from various branches and KOs, all of whom
were monitored by the FBI.
Frederick Joubert Duquesne was the accepted leader of
the group of German spies in America organized by the
Abwehr's Major Ritter.

A native of Cape Colony, South

Africa, and a naturalized American, Duquesne was in his
sixties when Sebold first met him, but still played an
active role in the espionage activities of his New York
ring.
Duquesne had worked for German intelligence to
sabotage British shipping during the First World War.

He

was arrested in New York in 1918 and an attempt to extradite
him was made by the British, who charged him with murder in
connection with the sinking of the British steamship
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"Tennyson."(13)

However, Duquesne escaped authorities until

1932, and by then Britain was no longer interested in
extradition on the old murder charge.

In October, 1937,

when Major Nikolaus Ritter arrived in the United States to
oversee the formation of a new spy group, he contacted
Duquesne who had remained on the Abwehr's "sleeper" list as
a prospective agent, and enlisted him to work actively for
the Abwehr.
Duquesne's ability to supply information endeared him
to his Abwehr masters, who were often amazed at his skill.
However, his aptitude in procurement involved no real
mystery.

Security and censorship were not always rigidly

enforced in the United States, and evidently Duquesne was
sufficiently talented to avoid incurring suspicion when he
attended Army maneuvers or visited ships in New York Harbor,
camera or notepad in hand.

In addition, Duquesne used a

variety of information contacts, who provided him with
scraps of intelligence which he forwarded to Germany for
insertion into the larger espionage puzzle.
When other means failed, Duquesne often obtained his
intelligence through letter writing.

He was able to obtain

a great deal of knowledge about American industrial products
and manufacturing conditions through written communications
in which he described himself as a student of the industry,
or as a wholesaler. (14)

For example, to acquire information

on a new gas mask the Army's Chemical Warfare Service was
developing, Duquesne wrote a letter to the head of the
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Service, identifying himself as a "well-known, responsible,
and reputable writer and lecturer," as well as a "good
citizen," and received what he had asked for through the
mail. (15)

Duquesne claimed to have obtained photographs of

a new Navy speedboat by writing to the Navy Department in
Washington. (16)
The intelligence Duquesne acquired included:
information on a new Garand rifle; tanks and anti-tank
weapons; the specifications of a new bomb he claimed the
DuPont plant in Delaware had developed; various drawings and
designs; reports on the nature and extent of equipment being
sent to Great Britain; and data on ship sailings. (17)

It

was Duquesne who reported Churchill's arrival in the United
States on the "King George V" in February, 1941, which of
course was patently untrue, but impressed everyone back in
Germany nevertheless since the ship had been in Annapolis
in January. (18)

Whether true or not, Duquesne always had

something to send.
By the time William Sebold arrived in the United
States to take up his guise as a radio operator for the
Abwehr, Frederick Duquesne had become more interested in
sabotage then in mere spying.

He informed Sebold (and the

FBI) of his plans to blow up the General Electric plant in
Schenectady, New York, and sabotage the DuPont powder works
at Wilmington, Delaware.

He also suggested putting a bomb

in Franklin Roosevelt's church at Hyde Park. (19)

In

addition, Duquesne advocated burning the French liner
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"Normandie," which had been refitted as a United States Navy
auxiliary ship and renamed the "Lafayette."(20)
Duquesne's proposed methods of sabotage included his
own invention, the "chiclet" bomb.

According to Duquesne,

one chewed the gum thoroughly and then folded it around a
phosphorous compound, after which it could be planted
anywhere without arousing suspicion.

The greatest advantage

of the "chiclet" bomb was its inability to explode in
temperatures under 72 degrees. (21)

Temperatures above 72

degrees would trigger a chemical reaction, causing the
phosphorous compound to generate intense heat, igniting
whatever it was attached to.

Duquesne explained that a

similar incendiary device could be made with candy.

For big

jobs he preferred a lead-pipe bomb with dynamite caps and a
slow-burning fuse. (22)
Hermann Lang, another of Sebold's contacts in America,
had proved to be one of the Abwehr's greatest American spy
coups, and a personal success for Major Ritter of
"Abwehrstelle" Hamburg and his spy operation in the United
States.

Lang worked as an assembly inspector at the Norden

plant, and had stolen and made copies of many of the
assembly blueprints of the Norden bombsight for the Abwehr.
In its quest for intelligence from the American Air
Force and aircraft industry, the German espionage
organization had long been interested in the bombsight
developed by American inventors.

Reportedly, this bombsight

enabled a bombardier to determine the exact moment a bomb
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must be dropped to accurately hit a target.

Different

versions of this sight had been developed and, of course,
the Abwehr was interested in any of them.

Requests had gone

out to the spy rings under Rumrich and Griebl in 1937, but
none of the members had access to information concerning the
bombsight.

In fact, Hermann Lang sent the first sketches of

the Norden bombsight to the Abwehr on his own initiative
through one of the numerous letter drops employed by the
Abwehr.

The primary reason for sending Nikolaus Ritter to

the United States was to facilitate the shipment of Lang's
information back to Germany and coordinate an espionage
ring. (23)
Hermann Lang was a naturalized American citizen, born
in Germany.

His motives as a spy were unique, since he did

not profess to be a believer in National Socialism nor did
he hate the United States.

He claimed no interest in

monetary rewards for his work as a spy, though he did not
refuse payment.

He considered himself to be a good German,

and his position as an assembly inspector at the Norden
plant gave him access to some of the bombsight blueprints.
Perhaps this and his misplaced patriotism were reasons
enough for his theft of the material.
For security reasons, sections of the sight were
assembled at different plants.

However, when Lang knew he

would have custody of certain sectional blueprints for a
number of days, he took them home at night and traced the
prints rather than leaving them in the safe at the plant.
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Over a period of time, Lang smuggled copies of Norden
bombsight parts to Germany by way of ship courier, where
they were assembled.

Missing parts were constructed by

Luftwaffe engineers. (24)

Lang himself made a trip to

Germany--courtesy of the Abwehr--to help with assembling a
new and improved bombsight, based on the Norden model,
developed by German experts.

There he received the

congratulations of Hermann Goering. (25)
Major Ritter also recruited two more "sleepers" for
work with the Abwehr during his trip to the United States in
1937.

Everett Roeder and Lilly Stein, along with Duquesne

and Lang, became part of William Sebold's major contact
circle.

According to FBI sources, Roeder had been born in

New York, but had evidently been approached by German
authorities during a visit to Germany, in much the same
manner as Sebold had been. (26)

The difference between the

two was that Roeder accepted the Abwehr's request to act as
a spy, primarily because of the money promised for any vital
information he could relay to Germany.

Roeder was employed

by the Sperry Gyroscope factory, which was involved in the
production of the Sperry bombsight and gyroscopes.

However

until his activation by spymaster Ritter, Roeder was kept as
a "sleeper," even during the Abwehr's crucial search for
intelligence on the Norden bombsight.
Roeder's employment as an engineer and designer at the
Sperry plant gave him access to a variety of confidential
mechanisms being developed for the United States Army and

48
Navy.

His deliveries to the Abwehr included specifications

of the radio instrumentation on the Glenn Martin bomber,
drawings of range-finders, blind-flying instruments, a
bank-and-turn indicator, and a navigator compass. (27)
Roeder also derived an income from his work as an inventor
of firearm-related devices, which he sometimes shared with
the Abwehr.

According to the FBI, Roeder was probably the

Abwehr's greatest producer of detailed technical data in
America. (28)
Vienna-born Lilly Stein worked as a fashion model in
New York City, and operated as a courier for Major Ritter.
Because of her work as a model, Stein developed ties to
influential people in New York and Washington.

Her ability

to move in society brought her into contact with many highly
placed individuals, and she was able to pick up information
by merely listening to the conversation of insiders.(29)
In the United States, the Abwehr had other spy rings
about which Sebold had varying degrees of information.
Among these was the group under the leadership of Kurt
Ludwig, an American of German parentage, who began his
espionage career in the United States in March of 1940.
Ludwig had spent most of his life in Germany, but upon
reaching maturity had indicated his desire to retain his
American citizenship.

FBI records state that Ludwig claimed

to have been involved with Adolf Hitler and the Nazis in the
Munich "Putsch" of 1923, and that he knew many high
officials in the Nazi party. (30)

In fact, according to

~
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Ludwig, it was Heinrich Himmler who encouraged him to become
an Abwehr agent and practice his spy craft in the United
States. (31)
Ludwig received his instructions from spymaster Major
Ulrich von der Osten of the Abwehr's KO in Spain.

Upon

arriving in the United States in 1940, Ludwig was directed
to form an espionage ring and obtain information concerning
the size, equipment, and location of American army, navy,
and airforce bases along the Eastern seaboard, as well as
information on arms production and convoy movements.

Ludwig

himself, usually accompanied by his secretary, Lucy
Boehmler, visited nearly every Army camp and airfield on the
East coast.
Often either Ludwig or his companion would draw
soldiers into conversations about their camp and its
equipment, where they had been before and whether they were
to be relocated.

A favorite way to collect information was

to pick up hitchhiking soldiers in the vicinity of army
camps.

Apparently Ludwig sometimes tried to disarm those he

was questioning with his ignorance.

In one instance, after

picking up two soldiers, he asked if the airplanes lined up
on the field could be bought for $1200.

The soldiers

responded that the particular planes sold for approximately
$30,000 each.

Ludwig then asked if the planes could fly as

fast as the speed of an automobile, and whether a large
cement mixer on the side of the road was an anti-aircraft
gun. (32)

Ludwig also visited many of the docks, harbors,
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and war factories along the coast, and even toured the White
House in Washington. (33)
Ludwig's group of seven was for the most part a young
and inexperienced company, with the noted exception of the
group's technical advisor, Paul Borchardt-Battuta, a retired
officer of the German army.

FBI reports indicate that prior

to his corning to the United States in early 1939, Borchardt
had been placed in Dachau concentration camp because of his
supposed Jewish heritage.

He was released after only

sixteen days, and with the help of German officials obtained
a non-quota visa to the United States. (34)
Borchardt had evidently been on the Abwehr's payroll
for a number of years, and his stay at Dachau was an
elaborate ruse designed to absolve him from suspicion in the
United States.

There is no doubt that Borchardt was sent to

the United States specifically to secure information
concerning its national defense preparations, thus marking
Borchardt as one of the few about whom there is concrete
evidence that he used his position as a "Jewish refugee" in
order to engage in espionage against America. (35)
Despite the youth of its members, the Ludwig ring was
a productive and active organization.

Aside from Borchardt,

Ludwig's contacts included a soldier stationed at Governor's
Island in New York Harbor.

Rene Froehlich supplied Ludwig

with lists of the admissions and discharges from the
military hospital on Governor's Island, from which Ludwig
was able to determine where specific military units were

1
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stationed.

Prior to his induction into the army, Froehlich

had provided Ludwig with technical and military magazines,
and in fact had established a magazine and book selling
business through which he was able to procure these
magazines, as well as army and navy publications at dealer's
prices. (36)

In his capacity as a soldier, Froehlich

continued to provide Ludwig with technical publications
concerning aviation and defense production, and had material
from the army and navy directed to him which he turned over
to Ludwig for transmission to Germany.(37)

Rene Froehlich

was born in Germany, but claimed American citizenship
through the naturalization of his father.
Hans Pagel and Frederick Schlosser were both members
of the German-American Youth Movement, an affiliate of the
Bund, and through this organization became acquainted with
Ludwig.

The two observed the ships and cargoes at the New

York City waterfront, and with Ludwig visited some of the
military establishments and defense plants in the area. (38)
Schlosser was born in the United States but Pagel was a
German citizen.
Another member of the group, Karl Mueller, also
accompanied Ludwig on trips to airports and defense plants
on Long Island, and furnished him with information
concerning airplane production in the United States. (39)
The sixth member, Helen Mayer, was born in Brooklyn.
She sought out individuals employed in the defense industry,
developed relationships with them, and pumped them for
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information about their jobs and production at their plants.
Her home served as a frequent meeting place for her group
and others interested in Germany's success, and she often
held parties which were attended--according to one
report--by "a lot of men with square-looking heads ••. and
good Heinie names."(40)

Mayer also helped Ludwig with his

correspondence to Germany, and provided him with magazines
and periodicals which contained information she deemed
valuable to his activities. (41)
Ludwig also employed Karl Schroetter of Miami, a
naturalized American and a former deputy sheriff in
Louisiana and Pennsylvania.

Schroetter reported to Ludwig

on the defense facilities located in Florida. (42)
An important member of the ring was eighteen year old
Lucy Boehmler, who acted as Ludwig's secretary.

Boehmler

accompanied Ludwig on his trips up and down the Atlantic
seaboard checking army and navy camps.

One of Lucy's most

important duties as Ludwig's assistant was to keep an active
card file on United States army camps, the disposition of
American military forces, troop movements, and arms
production. (43)
Boehmler's routine chores included frequent perusal of
the newspapers of the Eastern coast of the United States, as
well as the study of a number of technical journals,
manuals, or book publications such as Electrical World,
Iron Age, and The Aircraft Yearbook.

The American press

harbored a wealth of information and was a cheap and
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available source of intelligence.

From selected newspaper

sources, Lucy clipped articles pertaining to defense plants
along the East coast, or items about soldiers home on visits
to their families from camps identified in the reports.
From technical publications she was generally able to glean
significant details concerning production, raw materials,
and shipments by railroad or steamship. (44)
Lucy also maintained detailed records on Ludwig's
observations and of the intelligence gathered by the group,
and helped Ludwig in preparing secret messages for
transmission back to the Abwehr.

The information Ludwig

sent by mail to Germany through mail drops in Spain or
Portugal was either in code, or written on the backs or
between the lines of normal letters with a mixture of
Pyramidon--a headache remedy--and water.

The mixture dried

clear and invisible, but could be read if treated with
iodine. (45)

Lucy Boehmler was born in Germany, and like

Hans Pagel and Frederick Schlosser, had been active in the
Bund-affiliated German-American Youth group.
The Ludwig and Duquesne groups represented the most
successful period of German espionage in America, and what
the Abwehr considered its highest level of producing agents
in the United States.

Of course, it could only benefit

spymasters von der Osten, Pfeiffer, Ritter, and even Canaris
to tout their operations and agents in America.

The Abwehr

procured intelligence; it did not evaluate the information.
The Abwehr stations were supposed to dispense with blatantly

54

false intelligence before sending it on to the evaluating
agencies, but they rarely had the comprehensive
foreknowledge to know what to disregard, as in the case of
William Sebold and the information he was forwarding to the
Abwehr.

The truth was that the structure of the Third

Reich's intelligence apparatus fostered an uncontrolled
competition that saw each agency that dabbled in espionage
scrambling to be the first with the most.

Consequently, the

Abwehr felt obliged to jealously guard its position as the
intelligence and counterespionage organ of the German armed
forces, and to produce intelligence no matter how
questionable the information or the agents who sent it, for
there were other departments in the intelligence
establishment of the Third Reich anxious to discredit or
replace the Abwehr.
Criticism of Abwehr activities in the United States
between the beginning of the war in Europe and Pearl Harbor
emanated strongly from the German diplomats stationed in
America, particularly from the Charg~ of the German Embassy,
Dr. Hans Thomsen. (46)

Thomsen's boss, Foreign Secretary

Joachim von Ribbentrop, resented the reputed success of the
Abwehr in America and had sought to establish his own
intelligence network through his diplomats and German
missions abroad; however, he was forced to depend on the SD
and Abwehr for the majority of his secret intelligence. (47)
Ribbentrop opposed Abwehr actions in America for his own
reasons, but used the ammunition supplied by Abwehr mishaps,
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such as the exposure of Guenther Gustav Rumrich and the full
story behind his enlistment in the Abwehr, to enhance the
prestige of his own organization.

Hans Thomsen also

abhorred what he saw as incompetence on the part of the
Abwehr because he feared the further degeneration of
German-American relations.
Germany's invasion of Poland in the fall of 1939, the
invasion of Scandinavia, and the march across western Europe
culminating in the fall of France in June of 1940, brought
America closer to the side of Britain and further from
neutrality.

President Roosevelt responded in September,

1940, with an executive agreement that transferred fifty old
warships no longer in active service to the British in
exchange for eight air and naval bases on British
possessions ranging from Newfoundland to British Guiana.
Roosevelt continued assistance to Britain in 1941 with
Lend-Lease, which allowed goods and defense articles to go
to any nation whose defense the President considered vital
to the security of the United States.

Both the

bases-for-destroyers deal and Lend-Lease were violations of
the neutrality claimed by the United States, and were, in
essence, unofficial declarations of war against the Axis
powers.
In May, 1941, President Roosevelt declared an
unlimited national emergency and seized Axis-owned or
controlled ships in American ports.

After the sinking of

the American merchantman "Robin Moor" on May 21, 1941, by a
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German submarine, the President froze German and Italian
assets in the United States and ordered their consulates
closed.
The undeclared naval war between Germany and the
United States intensified through the summer of 1941.

In

July, American troops occupied Iceland; and in September,
President Roosevelt issued a shoot-on-sight order for German
U-boats.

Though isolationist groups decried the

administration's obvious violations of neutrality and
international law, most Americans apparently favored aid to
Britain, even at the risk of involving themselves.
Hans Thomsen, the German Charge, understood the
climate of American public opinion probably better than any
other German diplomat.

He was cognizant of the dangers

inherent in the attitudes of the political leaders of his
own country, who evidently had preconceived notions
regarding the power of the United States and its ability to
institute substantial military interference in Hitler's
plans.

Between 1939 and 1941, Thomsen was forced to deal

with increasing hostility from America, and an American
image of Germany which more and more depicted the Third
Reich as the enemy and a nation grasping for world
domination.

It comes as no surprise then, that Thomsen

viewed the Abwehr activities in the United States with
distaste and felt they could only jeopardize what were
already antagonistic foreign relations.
Thomsen felt that many of the spies he was familiar
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with were unsuited for espionage activity and he feared that
the exploitation of acts of German espionage would be used
to further anti-German propaganda and perhaps to justify
America's entry into the war.

Thomsen felt the United

States could be driven into a war, and used 1917 as an
example, when, he claimed, American public opinion was
incited as much by alleged and actual cases of sabotage as
by Germany's unlimited submarine war. (48)
Early in 1940, two men claiming to be Abwehr
free-lance agents came to the German embassy in Washington
asking for money.

The two agents, Hausberger and Bergmann,

claimed to have received instructions from the Abwehr's
Major von der Osten to organize a sabotage ring in the
United States. (49)

Thomsen was angry not only because the

Abwehr had spies and saboteurs in the United States, but
because they had employed agents with so little wit and
tact, who thought it natural to come to the embassy begging
for funds.
Thomsen saw the Abwehr's activities as one of the
surest ways to bring about direct participation of the
United States in the war.

Seeing it as his task to prevent

America's entry into the conflict, he asked that the
Wehrmacht terminate Abwehr activities in America.(50)
Admiral Canaris claimed the bumbling agents were not his,
and denied that any orders had been given for sabotage
operations in the United States. (51)

It was further stated

that the OKW shared the Foreign Ministry's political
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objections to sabotage, and it was reiterated that no
instructions had been given for such activities in the
United States.

As far as Canaris and the Abwehr were

concerned, the statements of Bergmann and Hausberger were
untrue. (52)

An irritated Thomsen cabled back that if

Hausberger and Bergmann were liars, then where did they get
their explosives, and who was representing himself falsely
as the Abwehr's Major von der Osten, who it was claimed,
gave the two would-be saboteurs their instructions?(53)
These accusations and denials could have gone on
indefinitely.

The Abwehr did not want to admit to anything

that would get it into trouble, and it was clear that
Thomsen's objections regarding the blundering and
ineffectual Abwehr agents who were jeopardizing American
neutrality, were damaging and were bound to reach
influential ears.

The German State Secretary, Ernst von

Weizsaecker, to whom Thomsen reported, was concerned over
the entire incident, since as late as April, 1940, Admiral
Canaris had assured Ribbentrop that the Abwehr had no agents
in the United States spying on the American army or
navy. (54)

Thomsen felt it was imperative that the Abwehr

refrain from their activities and Canaris was asked to
follow up on the agents whom Thomsen described as,
" ••• totally unsuited for the job ••.• "(55)
On June 10, 1940, the Abwehr suddenly remembered that
it had employed the two agents as "observers," not as
saboteurs, and that under the circumstances, the two men
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should return to Germany. (56)

Thomsen had won this

particular battle, but not the war.

The Abwehr continued to

operate agents in the United States and Thomsen continued to
rail against what he perceived as threats to American
neutrality.

Just ten days after the Abwehr admitted to

hiring Hausberger and Bergmann, a new agent from Weisbaden
arrived at the embassy and requested advice on where and how
to install his shortwave radio, and also asked for support
from the embassy in case of trouble with the American
authorities.

Thomsen's response to the OKW stated that,

" ••• if the German military authorities must keep this method
of procuring information, their agents must be prevented
from contacting the German Diplomatic Missions."(57)

When

the arrests of the Duquesne and Ludwig rings were made in
the summer of 1941, Thomsen wrote to the Foreign Office:
Intelligence agencies in Germany indiscriminately
trained totally unqualified persons and sent them to
the United States. The operations of the German
agencies were marked by naivete, carelessness and
lack of coordination. (58)
It was Thomsen's impression that the operations
conducted by these irresponsible and incompetent agents had
not benefitted Germany's conduct of the war, and had
certainly cost them the sympathy of the Americans. (59)
In September, 1941, the OKW formally objected to the
criticism of the activity of the Abwehr in the United States
made by the German embassy in Washington, but by then any
discussion of the problem was, for the most part, academic.
The arrests of the members of the Ludwig and Duquesne
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espionage groups by the FBI effectively shut down the
American-based spy rings so painstakingly developed by the
Abwehr.

Thomsen's attentions by then had turned elsewhere.

He was preoccupied with what had essentially become the
fiction of American neutrality, and the policies of the
Roosevelt administration which clearly indicated that
Germany's war with Britain ultimately meant American
involvement.
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CHAPTER V
"THE GREATEST SPY ROUNDUP IN U.S. HISTORY"
In a series of arrests beginning on June 28, 1941, the
members of the Duquesne ring were taken into custody by the
FBI.

J. Edgar Hoover made the first announcement of what he

described as, "the greatest spy roundup in American
history .•. "; and by June 30, the Abwehr knew that
thirty-three individuals associated with Duquesne had been
arrested. (1)
William G. Sebold was, of course, instrumental in the
breakup of the Duquesne ring.

Because Sebold took advantage

of the lax security within the Abwehr's American
organization, and the social club atmosphere where everyone
knew everyone else, the FBI was aware of other individuals
operating in the New York area.

However, Kurt Ludwig and

his eight associates were not picked up until August.

The

Ludwig group had been monitored as a separate case by the
FBI, for although the agency knew various spies were
operating apart from the Duquesne group, they were unsure of
the scope and extent of this second spy ring.
Ludwig communicated his intelligence primarily by
letter through neutral country mail drops to Germany.

He

had a shortwave radio installed in his car and through it
received instructions from the Abwehr.(2)

He also made use
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of a radio center in the Bronx set up by Axel Wheeler-Hill.
Ludwig rarely, if ever, used Sebold's radio to send
intelligence to the Abwehr.

Thus the big break for the FBI

on the Ludwig case came when the British secret service
turned over a series of letters intercepted by British
censors in Bermuda.

All the letters had been sent from New

York and signed "Joe K."(3)

When the letters were tested

chemically, the exposed message revealed that "Joe K." knew
a great deal about American aircraft production and the
identities of ships and their cargoes destined for Great
Britain. (4)
Despite the clues contributed by the British and the
"exhaustive efforts" of the FBI, the Bureau was unable to
confirm the true identity of "Joe K."

However, their search

was aided when a man named Julio Lopez Lido was run down and
killed by a taxi in Times Square on March 18, 1941.

Lido's

companion was seen taking the dead man's briefcase following
the accident, and apparently tried to gain possession of
Lido's luggage from his hotel after learning of Lido's
death. (5)

Investigation after the accident--including a

close examination of Lido's luggage--revealed that Julio
Lido was actually Ulrich von der Osten of the German
military intelligence service.
Osten had come to the United States at the behest of
Admiral Canaris to act as resident director of Abwehr
agents, with orders to coordinate agent activities and
improve overall organization. (6)

Kurt Ludwig was of course,
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Osten's companion, the man who had taken Osten's briefcase,
and who attempted to gain access to Osten's luggage.

When a

letter to Germany from "Joe K." was intercepted--again by
British censors--describing Osten's accident, federal agents
were able to put the letter and the results of the
investigation of Osten's death together and come up with
Ludwig as the identity of "Joe K."
FBI records confirm their knowledge of a connection
between the Duquesne group and Ludwig; in fact, Ludwig was
present at the arrest of two members of the Duquesne ring in
a bookstore in New York City on June 28, 1941. (7)

Before

the arrest, the federal agents had observed Ludwig
conferring with the two spies, but, " ... pretended not to
notice him and allowed him to continue with his activities,
he being under surveillance, of course."(8)
Following the arrests of Duquesne and his company,
Ludwig did little to merit FBI surveillance.

Ironically

enough, the Abwehr warned Ludwig to avoid relations with
William Sebold--"Tramp"--lest he jeopardize Sebold's
security. (9)

Ludwig stopped all espionage activities until

August, 1941, when during a trip across the country, his
"inborn espionage instincts" caused him to take note of
military camps and other defense establishments of interest
to the Abwehr. (10)

His cross-country trek was closely

followed by the FBI, and when it became apparent that
Ludwig's aim was to attempt to leave the United States for
Germany by way of Japan, he was arrested in Cle Elum,
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Washington.
The trial of Frederick Joubert Duquesne and his
thirty-two co-defendants began in September, 1941.

Fourteen

of the defendants, including Lang and Duquesne, entered
pleas of not guilty, despite the movies, photos, recordings,
and other incriminating evidence amassed by the FBI.

The

thirty-three defendants were indicted for violating the
espionage statutes and for violation of the Federal
Registration Act.

All were convicted and collectively

received more than 300 years in prison and were assessed
fines amounting to $19,000. (11)

Duquesne received a term of

twenty years and a fine of $2,000; Hermann Lang received a
term of twenty years; Everett Roeder was sentenced to
sixteen years and Lilly Stein twelve years. (12)
The only real drama in the trial was supplied by the
appearance of William G. Sebold, who surprised his fellow
agents and his Abwehr employers by revealing that he and his
espionage activities were part of an FBI undercover
operation.

Sebold's testimony caused an uproar within the

Abwehr, particularly since German intelligence had detected
nothing that indicated Sebold's FBI affiliation. (13)

In

using Sebold, the Abwehr had neglected to take even the most
elementary of precautions, and relied instead on the
Gestapo's assurances that Sebold had "volunteered" and was
thought to be a good candidate for espionage work.
said little for the Abwehr's screening process.

This

The fact

that Sebold was able to identify Major Ritter as the man who
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hired him, and finger everyone in the Duquesne ring, as well
as various other individuals, indicated that the Abwehr's
security system was extremely poor.
There was evidently a strong sense of immunity among
the German agents in America, because they had been able to
operate for so long without challenge by the American
authorities.

More and more agents were recruited who were

not properly instructed in the precautions important to an
operative's security.

It is particularly obvious in the

case of the Duquesne group that members violated the most
important of espionage principles: that of isolation.

There

was no conscious effort within the group to keep anything a
secret, and that made Sebold's job all the easier.
The trial of Kurt Ludwig and his eight associates
began on February 3, 1942, the first spy trial held in the
United States after the attack on Pearl Harbor and after
Germany's declaration of war on America.

The nine were

indicted on charges of conspiracy to violate the espionage
statutes, and all were convicted.

Lucy Boehmler, who turned

state's evidence and became the government's chief witness,
received the lightest sentence, five years.

Kurt Ludwig,

Rene Froehlich, and Paul Borchardt were each sentenced to
twenty years.

Helen Mayer, Karl Mueller and Hans Pagel

received terms of fifteen years each; Frederick Schlosser
received twelve years and Karl Schroetter, ten years. (14)
Media coverage of both trials was heavy.

Following

the Rumrich trial in 1938 and the outbreak of war in Europe

70

in 1939, America had essentially declared open season on
German spies and saboteurs.

On September 6, 1939, President

Roosevelt issued a directive which placed the FBI in charge
of investigating all suspected espionage and sabotage within
the United States. (15)

Local police authorities throughout

the nation were instructed to give the FBI all possible aid.
The nation-wide spy hunt and the publicity generated by the
spies, heightened awareness of who and what to look for.

A

natural consequence was that nearly every public-minded
citizen fancied himself a counterespionage agent in league
with the FBI.
Books, magazines, and newspapers produced facts and
figures which cited accidents, fires, and explosions on
ships, trains, in defense plants, navy yards, airbases and
army camps, and hinted that the cause was sabotage. (16)
Everyone wanted to know whether or not the nation was
overrun with Nazi spies and saboteurs.

With so many

arrested at once in late 1941, the answer seemed obvious.
Thus, most people were interested in the captured spies, and
there was a great deal of public fascination in their
appearance, their past operations, and their trials.

As was

most often the case, the American public received its
detailed information from newspapers, magazines and books,
media that sometimes used stereotypes and sensationalism to
heighten interest in the story.
American readers were told that, " .•• some of the spies
working for Hitler were known to consider an autographed
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photo of their Fuhrer the most precious reward they could
ask."(17)

Lilly Stein of the Duquesne ring was described as

a " ••• willowy person of about thirty who might have been
pretty had it not been for a sneer that constantly played
about her lips."(18)

The FBI claimed Stein had aspirations

of " .•. attaining fame as a second Mata Hari •••• "(19)

Rene

Froehlich was slurred less subtly: "Rene didn't have a bad
first name--for him. It could have been a girl's name, and
Froehlich walked like a girl."(20)
During the Ludwig trial, a description of Helen Mayer
listed her eyes as too small and too close together and her
nose as long, bony, and pointed. (21)

In fact, the reader

was asked to make note of how the facial pattern was
repeated in a number of the faces of those on trial. (22)

It

was noted that the government's chief witness, Lucy
Boehmler, had a cool and withdrawn quality about her.

This

was attributed " ••• to the essential cold-bloodedness of her
nature.

She spied for the fun of it."(23)

The characteristics of the FBI agents instrumental in
the apprehension of Ludwig were quite different than those
attributed to the German spies.

The Bureau operatives at

the trial were:
••• young, intelligent, sure of themselves in a
quiet, competent way. All of them seemed to be
college graduates, and each man had had special
training in the work he was assigned to do. They had
the straight, clear eyes, the firm jaws, the steady
look of men to whom life is a perilous adventure and
who are not afraid of it. (24)
Obviously the FBI was viewed as the nation's paramount
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counterespionage agency, and the prime power which had
"smashed" the enemy's spy rings.

However, the position of

the FBI was not as omnipotent as was believed, nor were the
successful arrests attributable only to the efforts of the
Bureau.
The initial investigation of the Duquesne ring can be
ascribed to the willingness of William Sebold to act as an
inside informer for the FBI.

Sebold was not obligated to

work with the American authorities, but volunteered on his
own initiative, though he knew his activities could endanger
his family still in Germany.

Similarly, the Ludwig case was

initially broken by the British censorship authorities who
gave their information to the FBI.

The Federal Bureau of

Investigation was not an inept organization, but despite J.
Edgar Hoover's accolades, the Bureau was not cracking cases
on its own.
The era of Frederick Joubert Duquesne and Kurt Ludwig
was the most successful for the Abwehr in America.
Following the large-scale arrests of Abwehr spies in the
summer of 1941, German espionage activities in the United
States were sharply curtailed and the Abwehr was never again
able to establish agents as firmly or acquire intelligence
on the same scale.

However, it has been clearly indicated

that much of the intelligence gathered by Germany's spies in
America came from relatively public sources, and
additionally, after 1940, the FBI controlled Sebold and
thereby controlled most of the intelligence information that
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left the United States.

The Abwehr agents made use of

various technical journals, visually recorded shipping
activities in the harbors and on the docks, and gathered
verbal as well as written information concerning defense
plants, military installations, and the war potential of the
United States.

True, Hermann Lang stole most of the

blueprints of the Norden bombsight and Everett Roeder
managed to obtain a great deal of technical data due to his
position at the Sperry Gyroscope plant, but these
individuals and their acquisitions were relatively unique.
Most of the information gathered by the spies was readily
available from the press and other sources which were open
to practically anyone in the United States: but the
significance of this knowledge was strongly dependent upon
how it was interpreted.

Thus the value the Germans put upon

the intelligence from America was determined by the manner
in which their intelligence agencies evaluated and made use
of the material.
It would be inaccurate, however, to state that
Germany's espionage activities in the United States prior to
Pearl Harbor were a complete failure.

Information was

received by the Abwehr from William Lonkowski, Ignatz
Griebl, Frederick Duquesne, Hermann Lang, Everett Roeder,
and Kurt Ludwig among others: information which the Abwehr
passed on to the evaluating agencies of the OKW.

However,

after 1940, the FBI had control of much of the information
sent out of the United States, particularly that which went

74
through Sebold.

It is also interesting to note that many of

these German evaluation agencies found that the agent's
reports were probably the least valuable of their major
sources, and were considered by some commanders to be far
below radio reconnaissance, prisoner interrogation, and the
press in comparable quality and accuracy. (25)

Undoubtedly

this was due to the Abwehr's lack of true examination of its
agent's reports before they were sent in.

This was most

evident in intelligence information which came from Britain,
all of which was in some way tampered with since all of the
German spies in England were double-agents under the control
of the British authorities. (26)
Despite the publicity surrounding the arrests and
trials of the Duquesne and Ludwig spy rings, the American
public was unable to determine from available sources how
effective German espionage in the United States actually
was.

Nevertheless, American citizens were kept aware of the

real or imagined dangers espionage agents and saboteurs held
for the United States.

Some of the more sensation-seeking

books and articles claimed for example, that the sinking of
the merchantman "Robin Moor" in May, 1941, and the
destruction by fire of the liner "Normandie" in February,
1942, were due respectively to Nazi spy reports and
sabotage. (27)
Hollywood too, contributed to the public's concept of
who the enemy spies were and what they were up to.

A number

of films were cranked out, among them "Confessions of a Nazi
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Spy," released in 1937, "Saboteur," and "Dawn Express," in
1942, and "Watch on the Rhine," released in 1943.

These

films chronicled Hollywood's version of Nazi espionage and
sabotage in America, and served to keep the spy image
larger than life by ascribing some rather outlandish
behavior to the Nazi agents operating in the United States.
The films were pure Hollywood camp, portraying a few
stalwart Americans single-handedly defeating dozens of enemy
spies.

In the war according to Hollywood, it was often the

amateur who apprehended enemy spies and saboteurs, while
officials followed false leads. (28)

But whatever the

quality of its films, Hollywood was consistent in its
portrayal of Nazism and its adherents as absolutely evil.
Popular fiction also reinforced the view of the evil
Nazi, often depicting arrogance and cruelty as common German
characteristics.

John Steinbeck's The Moon is Down,

published in 1942, told the story of a Norwegian town taken
over by the Nazis, and is a good example of the strain of
anti-Nazi literature common in America at the time that
pitted the courageous forces of good against wickedness. (29)
In the months following Pearl Harbor the publicity
generated by enemy spies had a strong effect on the American
public, as evidenced by the unofficial help given the FBI by
members of the populace.

Americans were rightly warned

about the serious effects indiscriminate talking about
troops, ships, planes, production, fortifications, and even
the weather could have on the war effort.

But even these
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righteous cautions served to instill feelings in the United
States that spies could, and probably were, operating
everywhere.

No one really knew what information the enemy

considered valuable, therefore anything could be construed
as a military secret.
However, the effort to be patriotic sometimes took a
ludicrous turn, as when the FBI received letters from
helpful Northwesterners telling how Japanese disguised as
salmon were swimming up the Columbia River. (30)

Federal

agents were also advised by anxious citizens that German
spies were communicating with each other through the water
faucets. (31)

Other stories investigated by the FBI included

reports of landings by enemy parachutists, civilian fears
that saboteurs were putting ground glass into food products,
and finally that mysterious flashing lights were German
spies signaling each other. (32)

Examination by the FBI

disproved each allegation, yet these stories confirm the
fact that a state of anxiety generated by the presumed
threats posed by enemy spies and saboteurs existed in the
minds of many Americans.
The average American was bombarded with factual and
fictional information about Nazis and enemy agents from
movies, books, magazines, and newspapers; nevertheless
citizens were particularly admonished not to discuss or
repeat anything true or untrue about spies or saboteurs
operating in the United States. (33)

It was believed that

any loose discussion about the opposition's espionage
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activity could serve as a means of spreading panic around
the country. ( 34)
Yet those same sources that claimed to be fighting the
war against spies and saboteurs acted almost as a catalyst
in furthering spy hysteria in America.

Americans were

advised that the German psyche allowed no mercy to be shown
to the enemy. (35)

It was further stated:

Saboteurs and fifth columnists in this country
will stop at nothing. Poisoned water supply
systems, poisoned milk for babies, blasts of huge
magnitude in schools and department stores and other
panic centres[sic]; bombs planted in the homes of
high government officials, chemical poisons
unleashed against men in army and naval training
centres[sic]; wholesale murders of key war
production workers--all that is definitely on the
German sabotage timetable. (36)
As the United States geared up to join the war effort
against Hitler, there was a strong current of emotion
against the "Nazi terror," and a belief that the war would
encourage German espionage agents to work to undermine and
ultimately destroy the United States.

It was impossible to

know that by 1942, the Abwehr and the Third Reich had
already played out their strongest cards.

Adolf Hitler's

attempt to quickly conquer the Soviet Union had already
failed, and on December 11, 1941, Hitler ignored the lessons
of history, underrated the power of America and declared war
on the United States.

The Reich that was to have endured

for a thousand years was destined to fall much sooner.
Admiral Canaris' Abwehr would survive an even shorter
period.

------

--
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German spying in America was far from the omniscient,
all-pervading activity that many believed in and feared.
True, the arrests and trials of German spies in 1938, late
1941, and early 1942 confirmed that spying had occurred in
the United States, yet these facts were reinforced by a
visual and written message to the American people that not
only boosted a heartless and depraved image of the Nazi, but
also suggested that these "treacherous" and "insidious"
spies were everywhere, working to undermine the world's
foremost democracy.

Thus, for many Americans, truth was

augmented by wild rumor, rumor fanned by apprehension, and
what was believed took precedence over fact.
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CHAPTER VI
OPERATION PASTORIUS
When the United States finally became involved in the
war in December, 1941, following the Japanese attack on
Pearl Harbor and Germany's declaration of war, Abwehr I was
virtually without any good American agents.

The majority of

spies under their control in the United States were taken
out of action by the FBI in the summer of 1941.

As a

result, when Adolf Hitler began insisting in 1942 that a
program of sabotage be instituted against the United States,
Admiral Canaris and General Erwin von Lahousen, who headed
the sabotage division of the Abwehr, decided that saboteurs
from the Reich would have to be landed on America's
shores. (1)
The magnitude of the war to which they were officially
committed increased the awareness of Americans to the
dangers posed by enemy saboteurs.

Americans were warned

that much of Hitler's early successes were aided by the
internal collapse of the countries he invaded and ultimately
conquered, breakdowns which were precipitated by the actions
of German fifth columnists and saboteurs. (2)

Americans took

much solace in the fact that their world was separated from
that of their enemies by two oceans, yet there was a very
real fear of sabotage and treachery from within as evidenced
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by the way Americans and their leaders reacted to the highly
visible Japanese-American section of the population.
Germans living in the United States were spared the
internment camps and the sort of prejudice directed against
the Japanese; but Nazi Germany remained the power that
excited the highest suspicions, and its purported control
over its nationals abroad generated fear.

The Specter of

Sabotage, published in December, 1941, stated:
The Nazis know the whereabouts of nearly all
German nationals in the United States and past
experience teaches us that Germany is the specialist
among nations in the murderous business of sabotage
and espionage. To the Nazis, therefore, goes the
dubious distinction of heading the list of those
from whom we have most to fear in any consideration
of the threat of sabotage. (3)
The Abwehr chose the candidates for a sabotage mission
to the United States from the files of the "Deutsches
Ausland-Institut."

Lahousen wanted men who spoke English,

had lived in America, and were familiar with American
customs, and the "Ausland Institut" was a good place to look
for individuals with these qualifications.

A pre-Nazi

organization formed in 1917, the "Ausland-Institut" had
originally operated as a propaganda agency, but changed its
function after World War I, when it began collecting
information on other countries to help Germans find
opportunities overseas.

After Nazification, the "Ausland

Institut" continued collecting information on foreign
countries from German residents abroad.

It also held

extensive files on Germans who had lived abroad but had
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returned to Germany.

The functions of the "Ausland

Institut" under the Nazis confirmed that Germany had
knowledge of, if not control over, many Germans living
outside the Reich.
The man Lahousen appointed to recruit the would-be
saboteurs was Lieutenant Walter Kappe, an officer of Abwehr
II, the sabotage division.

Kappe had lived in the United

States from 1925 to 1937, had been active in pro-Nazi
groups, and was instrumental in forming "Teutonia," the
first national Nazi organization in America. (4)

As the

National Socialist party in Germany became more powerful,
"Teutonia" became the Friends of the Hitler Movement, the
Friends of the New Germany, and finally the German-American
Bund.

Kappe was named Press and Propaganda Chief of the

organization in 1933, but apparently tried and failed to
overthrow the American Fuhrer, Fritz Kuhn, and was thrown
out of the group in 1937. (5)
Upon returning to Germany, Kappe became propaganda
director for a radio station in Berlin which broadcast to
North and South America.

When war came he served a short

time in the army before being assigned to the Abwehr.
Because Kappe himself had lived in the United States for a
number of years, he worked with the files of the
"Ausland-Institut," paying particular attention to those
repatriated Germans who had also lived in the United States.
Hostility between the United States and Germany had
increased dramatically between 1939 and 1941, and naturally
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the Nazis were interested in those individuals who had spent
time in America and who were familiar with the country.
After a long process of interviews and eliminations,
Walter Kappe selected twelve men from the records of the
"Ausland-Institut" for a sabotage mission to the United
States.

The codename for the project was "Pastorius," named

after Daniel Pastorius, the leader of one of the first
groups of immigrant Germans to land in the United States
almost 260 years before. (6)
Kappe arranged to have all twelve men transferred from
their assorted posts in the army or in defense plants to the
Abwehr's sabotage training school at Quentz Lake in
Brandenburg.

There they spoke only English and underwent

three weeks of instruction on the various methods of
destroying industrial targets in America.

The men were

educated in general chemistry, learned how to combine
incendiary mixtures and how to ignite them.

They studied

different kinds of fuses, detonators, and primers, as well
as electrical, mechanical, and chemical timing devices. (7)
The men were tested under realistic conditions in finding
their targets, deciding whether to use an explosive or an
incendiary device, how much to use, and finally, escaping
detection.

Kappe and his men toured lock gates on rivers

and canals, railroads, and a few of Germany's major aluminum
and magnesium plants, including the I.G. Farben aluminum
plants in Bitterfeld.

The saboteurs were instructed about

the vulnerability of these sites and were shown which key
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points were most susceptible to damage. (8)
The saboteurs were also drilled daily in their
personal, albeit fictitious, biographies.

If questioned,

the saboteurs were to maintain they had never left America,
and were given forged Selective Service cards and letters
with American stamps and recent postmarks to carry. (9)

In

addition, the men were instructed in the making of invisible
inks and the use of secret writing for communication through
the regular mail.
The three week training period served to weed out
those who showed no aptitude for sabotage work.

Kappe

dismissed three of the original twelve, and divided the
remaining nine into two groups.

George John Dasch was

appointed the leader of one group, Edward John Kerling the
other.
At thirty-nine, George Dasch was the oldest member of
the sabotage group and had spent nineteen years in the
United States--more than any of his companions.

Dasch had

been born in the Rhineland and had served Germany in the
last year of the First World War.

Like many of his

countrymen, he found life in Germany hard after defeat in
1918, and in October, 1922, entered America as a stowaway.
(10)
Dasch worked as a waiter and a dishwasher in
restaurants and hotels around the country, and in 1927
joined the United States Army Air Corps.

After serving a

little over a year, Dasch purchased his way out of the army
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and received an honorable discharge and an "excellent"
character rating. (11)

He married an American woman shortly

after leaving the army, and later filed a declaration of
intention to become a citizen of the United States, but
never filed the final citizenship papers.
In 1941, Dasch left New York City for San Francisco,
traveled by boat to Japan, and by railroad overland through
Manchuria and Russia to Berlin, where he arrived on May 13,
1941.

Dasch was employed in Germany by the "Sonderdienst

Seehaus," a radio monitoring service which operated under
the combined auspices of the off ices of Goebbels and
Ribbentrop. (12)

Since the "Sonderdienst Seehaus" listened

to foreign broadcasts, its employees had to know a foreign
language well, be fairly up to date on the politics and
customs of the country whose broadcasts they listened to,
and be able to translate what they heard into German.
Consequently the "Seehaus" preferred to hire Germans who had
lived abroad.

Dasch listened to American news broadcasts

for approximately six months before he was approached by
Walter Kappe as a prospective candidate for a sabotage
mission to the United States.

Dasch was placed under Kappe

and transferred to Abwehr II in February, 1942.
Edward Kerling was born in Wiesbaden, Germany in 1909,
and became an early member of the Nazi Party in 1928.
Kerling came to the United States on an immigrant quota visa
and worked primarily as a chauffeur and a domestic servant.
He married a German-born woman in America, and apparently
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was active in the German-American Bund. (13)
Shortly after the war in Europe began, Kerling and a
few Bundist friends--including Hermann Neubauer who would
later join Kerling on the sabotage mission to the United
States--purchased a sailboat, the "Lekala," with the
intention of returning to Germany to help its war effort.
The yawl and its passengers were investigated by the Coast
Guard, the FBI, and Immigration and Customs officials for
possible violations of American law.

Kerling was ordered to

dispose of the boat, and shortly after its sale in June,
1940, he departed for Germany on the SS "Exchordia."(14)
Like Dasch, Kerling obtained employment as a translator of
English-language radio broadcasts.

He went from there to a

position in the Propaganda Ministry in Berlin. (15)
Kerling was approached by Kappe in March, 1942, and
interviewed for what he was informed was a secret "military
mission" in the United States.

Kerling agreed to what he

thought would be a commando raid carried out by soldiers in
uniform.

He was not apprised of the sabotage mission until

he arrived at the training center in Brandenburg. (16)
Dasch and his group of four were to land off the coast
of Long Island, New York.

His companions included: Ernest

Peter Burger, Joseph Schmidt, Heinrich Heinck, and Richard
Quirin.
Apart from the two group leaders, Ernest Peter Burger
was the most important member of the mission, for it was
Burger whom Kappe appointed to set up a front to serve as a
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communications center for the sabotage mission.

Burger was

also to maintain written, coded contact with Kappe and the
Abwehr, since Walter Kappe himself planned to come to the
United States and direct sabotage operations as soon as all
the groups he intended to send over were stabilized.
Burger was born in 1906 in Bavarian Germany, joined
the Nazi party early, and marched with Hitler in the Munich
Beer Hall Putsch of 1923.

As a member of Hitler's

brown-shirted "Sturmabteilung"--storm detachment--or SA,
Burger fought in innumerable street battles.

During

peaceful interludes, he completed his technical education
and worked as a machinist.

In 1927, Burger came to the

United States on an immigrant visa, found employment as a
machinist, joined the National Guard, and became a
naturalized citizen. (17)
Burger returned to Germany after Hitler's appointment
as Chancellor in 1933, and was attached to the staff of
Ernst R5hm, head of the SA.

Burger escaped the purge of the

SA on June 30, 1934, and eventually found employment in the
domestic propaganda branch of the Party.

In March, 1940,

Burger was arrested by the Gestapo and accused of falsifying
government documents, apparently for critical remarks
contained in a geopolitical report he wrote concerning the
Gestapo's activities in Poland.

He was released in July,

1941, drafted as a private in the army, and was engaged in
guarding British and Yugoslav prisoners-of-war when his name
was discovered by Kappe in the files of the
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"Ausland-Institut."(18)
Heinrich Heinck and Richard Quirin were both born in
Germany, and both had received training as machinists.

In

1927, the two men had come to the United States--Quirin
legally as an immigrant, Heinck illegally after jumping
ship.

Heinck and Quirin joined the Bund and its storm troop

division, the "Ordnungsdienst."

In 1939, both men took

advantage of Germany's offer to pay the expenses of those
who wanted to return to the Reich.

They finally met at the

Volkswagen plant in Braunschweig where they were assigned to
work.

Heinck and Quirin were recruited for the sabotage

mission by Walter Kappe who, representing the
"Ausland-Institut," had lectured those employees at
Braunschweig who had once lived in the United States. (19)
Joseph Schmidt was the fifth member of group that was
to land off of Long Island in America.

He too, had been

born in Germany, but left during the unsteady years of the
Weimar Republic and had gone to Canada.

There he had lived

by hunting, trapping, and selling alcohol to the Indians.
Schmidt expressed his desire to go off on his own to Canada
and start forest fires, but Kappe vetoed the suggestion.
Schmidt completed the training with his fellow-saboteurs and
accompanied them on their final leave in Paris and to their
departure point in Lorient, France.

However, Schmidt found

he had contracted gonorrhea during the Paris holiday, and
Kappe would not let him on the close-quartered
submarine. (20)

With Schmidt's departure, the two groups
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were evenly matched at four each.
Herbert Hans Haupt was the youngest member of the
sabotage mission.

A member of Kerling's company which

included Hermann Neubauer and Werner Thiel, Haupt was born
in 1919 in Stettin, Germany.

Haupt came to the United

States with his family when he was five, and became
naturalized in 1930 when his father received citizenship.
In June, 1941, Haupt, accompanied by a friend, left the
United States for Mexico to escape a pregnant girlfriend.
When their money ran out, Haupt and Wolfgang Wergin accepted
the help of the German Consulate which paid their fare to
Japan on the pretext that there was employment for them
there.

Faced with work in a labor camp in Japan, Haupt and

Wergin found working passage on a German freighter leaving
for France, which arrived in Bordeaux on December 11, 1941,
the day Germany declared war on the United States.

Haupt

was allowed to stay with his grandmother in Germany, but had
to endure frequent questioning by the Gestapo, and the
inability to acquire a work permit and find a job. (21)
Haupt was contacted by Walter Kappe in early 1942
about the possibility of an article Haupt might want to
write about his trip to Germany.

It was during the second

interview that Kappe asked Haupt if he would be willing to
return to the United States where " ••• certain unspecified
duties might be expected of him •••• "(22)

Haupt agreed and

was sent to Quentz Lake where he learned of the sabotage
mission.
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Like their companions, Hermann Neubauer and Werner
Thiel had been born in Germany and had come to the United
States before Hitler came to power, hoping for opportunities
that had not presented themselves in Germany.

Neubauer

arrived in America in 1931 and found work as a cook in
restaurants, hotels, and on an occasional ocean liner.

He

became a member of the German-American Bund, and later
joined the Nazi Party.

He applied for his first citizenship

papers but did not obtain final naturalization. (23)
In 1939, Neubauer joined Edward Kerling on the boat
"Lekala" in an attempt to sail to Germany.

After this plan

was foiled by the Coast Guard, Neubauer and his wife
returned to Germany via Lisbon in July, 1940.

Neubauer was

drafted into the German army and served in the Polish
campaign and in the first days of the war with Russia.

He

was wounded and while recuperating received a letter from
Walter Kappe asking if he " ••. would be willing to go on a
secret assignment to a foreign country where he had once
lived."(24)

Neubauer agreed and learned of the sabotage

plans in Kappe's office.
Werner Thiel was trained as a machinist and worked for
the Ford plant and General Motors after coming to Detroit in
1927.

He filed a declaration of intent to become a citizen

but made no further attempt to receive final naturalization.
Thiel lost his job when the depression struck and was forced
to travel around the country picking up what work he could.
During this time he joined the Friends of the New Germany
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and later the Bund. (25)
Thiel returned to Germany in the spring of 1941, and
met George Dasch during the crossing.

He found employment

in a war plant until March, 1942, when he was approached by
both Kappe and Dasch about returning to the United States to
do "something."(26)

Thiel was informed of the nature of the

mission discussed by Kappe and Dasch when he arrived at
Quentz Lake.
The equipment the two sabotage groups woul9 carry via
submarine to the United States was packed in wooden crates
lined with steel to insure against water damage.

The crates

contained explosives, some of which were designed to look
like lumps of coal.

Also included in the crates were

fuses, detonators, timing devices, and pen and pencil sets
which were actually incendiary bombs. (27)
The men were also supplied with a quantity of American
currency for expenses they were expected to accrue in the
United States.

Each group leader was given $50,000 as a

general fund for buying sabotage materials, travel, bribes,
and other group expenses.

Each of the saboteurs was given

$9,000, $5,000 of which was held by the group leader.

In

addition all of the men received $450 in small bills for
immediate use in America. (28)

However, some of the bills

issued to the saboteurs had to be exchanged or discarded
since they were gold certificates which had been withdrawn
from circulation when America went off the gold standard in
April, 1933. (29)

All of the saboteurs were equipped with a

I
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special money belt designed by George Dasch.
While the group was to forego radio contact with the
Abwehr in Germany, both Kerling and Dasch were given a white
handkerchief on which was written in invisible ink the name
and address of a mail drop in Lisbon through which they
could communicate with Kappe.

The handkerchiefs also had

the names of two trustworthy people in the United States
whom the saboteurs could call on for help.

Kerling's

information included the address of Dasch's brother in New
York, and Dasch's that of Herbert Haupt's uncle in Chicago.
The two leaders could communicate with each other through
these mail drops until Burger had the communications center
set up, and even after if circumstances warranted it. (30)

' Before they were to depart, the eight saboteurs were
informed of their sabotage objectives in the United States.
Because aluminum and magnesium production was important to
the American war effort, specific targets included three of
the plants of the Aluminum Company of America at Alcoa,
Tennessee, East St. Louis, Illinois and Massena, New York.
The Philadelphia Salt Company's cryolite plant in
Philadelphia was also slated as a target because it provided
materials essential to the production of aluminum. (31)
Vulnerable spots along the Chesapeake and Ohio
railroad were to be damaged to disrupt the carrying of coal,
as well as the Pennsylvania Railroad terminal in Newark, New
Jersey, through which large quantities of war products and
raw materials passed daily.

Destruction of the Pennsylvania
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railroad's horseshoe curve at Altoona, Pennsylvania, and
interference in rail transportation was stressed as an
important step in crippling that state's anthracite coal
industry.

Other targets included: the Hell Gate Bridge over

the East River in New York City; locks and canals on the
Ohio River between Cincinnati and St. Louis; and the water
reservoirs of New York City. (32)

These were specific

targets and did not represent all the mission's objectives.
Aside from these goals, it was largely up to the group
leaders what was to be sabotaged and when; however Kappe
emphasized the importance of any acts of sabotage that would
disrupt industry or damage transportation facilities and
thus slow the passage of war materials.

In addition, Kappe

advocated a series of nuisance bombings in public spots
around the country to undermine American morale.
Following the weekend in Paris where Schmidt caught
gonorrhea and the rest of the men got drunk, the remaining
eight saboteurs, accompanied by Walter Kappe, travelled to
the Lorient naval base which the Germans had occupied since
June, 1940.

On May 26, 1942, Kerling and his group left for

Florida aboard the submarine U-584.
left two days later on the U-202.

Dasch and his group
The two groups arrived in

the United States in the early hours of June 17 and June 13,
respectively.
George Dasch and his companions landed on the beach at
Amagansett Beach on Long Island.

They wore German naval

uniforms so they would be treated as prisoners of war and

-1
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not spies in case they were caught.

Shortly after the four

men and their crates of explosives had been landed on the
beach, they were approached by a patrolling Coast Guardsman,
twenty-one-year-old John Cullen.

Dasch told Cullen that he

and his friends were fishermen who had run aground.

When

Cullen invited them to spend the rest of the foggy night at
the Coast Guard Station, Dasch refused, saying that they had
neither identification papers nor a fishing permit.
Cullen insisted, Dasch threatened to kill him.

When

After

speaking of murder, Dasch abruptly changed tactics and
offered Cullen a bribe to "forget what he had seen."

Cullen

accepted the money and was about to leave when Dasch gave
him the name he would be operating under in America--"George
John Davis"--and oddly enough, demanded that Cullen look
closely at his face.

After the patrolman left, Dasch and

the other saboteurs buried their German uniforms and their
trunks of explosives on the beach, walked to the train
station at Amagansett, and rode the train to Manhattan. (33)
Kerling's group landed without incident at Ponte
Vedra, Florida, about seven miles south of Jacksonville.
After burying their crates of explosives in the sand, they
travelled by bus to Jacksonville where they separated.
Herbert Haupt and Hermann Neubauer went to Chicago, Edward
Kerling and Werner Thiel to New York City by way of
Cincinnati.

Both groups were to establish themselves

securely before taking any action, and each group was to
work separately--Kerling's primarily in New York and

-1
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Pennsylvania and Dasch's in the Midwest.

Kerling and Dasch

were to meet in Cincinnati on July 4 to compare progress
reports and discuss sabotage plans.
When John Cullen ran back to the Coast Guard Station
at Amagansett in the early morning hours of June 13, 1942,
it was to raise the alarm over his confrontation with the
men on the beach, one of whom had threatened his life and
then had given him money.

Cullen returned to the beach

about twenty minutes later with a group of Coast Guardsmen
to search the area, but Dasch and his men were gone.

The

searchers could hear the diesel motor of the submarine and
the smell of diesel oil was strong along the beach, but the
U-boat was never clearly seen. (34)

Until daylight, nothing

suspicious was found except a package of German cigarettes.
However, later in the morning, the searchers found the boxes
of explosives and the German naval uniforms, which they
turned over to the FBI. (35)
Certain that the evidence they possessed signified an
invasion attempt by Nazi saboteurs, federal agents
questioned residents of the area as well as known Nazi
sympathizers around Long Island in the hopes that someone
could corroborate the description of Dasch supplied by
Cullen.

With little to go on aside from Cullen's testimony,

the explosives, and the uniforms, it was a number of days
before the Bureau could ascertain that the saboteurs had
probably headed for New York City and the near anonymity of
its immense population.
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Though Dasch had been instructed by Walter Kappe to
establish himself and his men in Chicago as soon as possible
after arriving in the United States, he delayed moving his
group, which upset Quirin and Heinck, both of whom disliked
Dasch.

Dasch reveled in his return to New York City and the

power he derived from the money supplied by the Abwehr.
However, unbeknownst to his companions, Dasch's plans for
the sabotage mission were vastly different from those
envisioned by Walter Kappe and the Abwehr.

George Dasch had

decided to betray Operation Pastorius; whether he decided
this prior to his arrival in the United States or because he
believed both he and the mission had been compromised by his
encounter with Coast Guardsman Cullen, is uncertain.
Whatever the reason, Dasch made his first telephone call to
the FBI in the late afternoon of Sunday, June 14, little
more than twenty-four hours after his arrival in
America. (36)
In his initial telephone conversation, Dasch
identified himself as "Franz Daniel Pastorius," and stated
that he had come from Germany to New York with information
he would give only to J. Edgar Hoover.

The agent he spoke

to gave him little encouragement, thinking, no doubt, that
it was one of the many crank calls directed to the FBI.
Dasch stated that he would come to Washington later in the
week and deliver his information personally. (37)
Dasch had apprised only Peter Burger of his plans to
wreck Pastorius, and gave Burger the option of either going
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along with him or being arrested as a spy when Dasch gave
everything away to the authorities.

Because of the

compatibility of Richard Quirin and Heinrich Heinck, Dasch
and Burger had been thrown together as partners within the
sabotage group; thus Dasch saw Burger as his only choice for
an accomplice, someone who would back up the story he wanted
to tell the FBI.

Though Lieutenant Kappe had warned each of

the saboteurs that death was the penalty for revealing
either what they learned in Germany or the purpose of the
sabotage mission, the power of the Abwehr to enforce their
punishment was small beside that of the death penalty the
United States government would almost certainly mete out to
convicted saboteurs.

Burger for his part must have sensed

that his personal survival depended on his support of
Dasch's betrayal, and thus agreed to play the role of the
silent partner.
Aside from a tense meeting on June 14, Dasch had
avoided all contact with Quirin and Heinck, preferring to
let Burger deal with the frustrations and security fears
stemming from their stay in New York City.

Free from the

stress of maintaining the guise of one dedicated to the
sabotage mission, Dasch enjoyed a thirty-six hour stint of
two-handed pinochle before leaving for Washington, D.C. on
the afternoon of June 18. (38)
He made his second call to the FBI the following
morning, identifying himself as "George Davis," the leader
of eight saboteurs from Germany.

By this time the FBI
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offices had been informed of Cullen's report and the
discovery of the crates of explosives. buried on the beach at
Amagansett.

Agents were sent to question Dasch.

Dasch was placed in protective custody by the Bureau,
and subjected to an intense period of interrogation.

He not

only exposed the men in his own group, but surprised the FBI
with information about Kerling's group and their landing in
Florida, about which the FBI had no prior knowledge or
suspicion.

A week after they had arrived in the United

States, all four of the spies who landed on the beach at
Amagansett were in the hands of the FBI.
The arrest of Kerling's group took longer, primarily
because Dasch was not certain of the time of the Florida
landing, or where Kerling would send the members of his
group.

Dasch claimed to have forgotten that ammonia fumes

would activate the invisible writing on the handkerchief
that contained the names of Kerling's contacts in the United
States, and the Bureau laboratory had to discover the key
for themselves. (39)
It was not until Tuesday, June 23, that federal agents
were assigned to watch Helmut Leiner, a close friend of
Kerling's, and as his name on the handkerchief revealed, one
considered reliable enough by the Abwehr to serve as a
source of help to their saboteurs.

FBI agents followed

Leiner from his home on Long Island to New York City where
he met with Edward Kerling and Werner Thiel.

Kerling was

arrested that evening and Thiel two days later.
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The FBI did not have to search long for Herbert Haupt.
He came to the FBI office in Chicago on his own initiative
on the morning of June 22, to explain his absence from the
United States and to clarify his selective service status,
about which the FBI had questioned his parents prior to his
return to America.

Haupt's cover included using his own

name and maintaining that he had never left Mexico during
the year he was away from America; unfortunately his
well-rehearsed story was wasted on the the federal agent who
listened to him.

Dasch had already given Haupt's name to

the FBI.
Haupt was followed in the hope that he would lead to
the last of the saboteurs, Hermann Neubauer, but the two
never met.

Haupt was finally arrested on Saturday, June 27,

and it was only after his interrogation that the FBI was
able to locate Neubauer.
Throughout his days in the protective custody of the
FBI, George Dasch had apparently envisioned himself a second
William Sebold; a double agent working with the authorities,
aiding in the arrests of enemy saboteurs, and ultimately
receiving well-deserved accolades as an American hero. (40)
Unfortunately for Dasch, the FBI and the Justice Department
evidently did not believe the story of his deep-rooted
antipathy toward the Nazis, or that he had planned from the
beginning to betray the mission in the United States.
Instead, as the prosecutor in the case suggested, they
believed that Dasch had gotten "cold feet" when he was
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observed on the beach at Amagansett by a member of the Coast
Guard shore patrol.

Dasch was arrested and charged along

with his seven companions, all of whom were liable for the
death penalty under America's wartime regulations.
The arrests of the saboteurs were made public on the
evening of June 27, 1942, by J. Edgar Hoover who assumed
full credit for the FBI.

Hoover played down the role of the

Coast Guard, and made no mention of Dasch's confession.

The

report prepared by the FBI on the case, RE: GEORGE JOHN
DASCH, with aliases, et al SABOTAGE, and released in
November, 1942, did describe the actions taken by the Coast
Guard at Amagansett Beach, but again contained nothing of
the voluntary confession of George Dasch, which for all
purposes, solved the case for the FBI. (41)
However, at the time of the announcement the American
public had little interest in the self-serving maneuvers of
the Bureau, or in who or what had captured the German
saboteurs.

That they were in custody was enough for the

majority of Americans, most of whom treated the news of the
arrests as a victory of sorts--a triumph over the Nazi
invaders.

Public opinion was very obviously against the

captured Germans, and demands for the death penalty were
rife across the pages of newspapers and magazines. (42)

The

summer of 1942 was not a terribly successful time for
America and its allies, with the Axis offensive in North
Africa, the German advance in the Soviet Union, the almost
constant bombardment of England, and the costly victory at
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Midway.

The capture of the German saboteurs gave Americans

a badly needed win, and the nation wasted no pity on those
who had sought to bring the war so much closer to home.
The trial of the eight men began on July 8, 1942, in
Washington, D.C.

Although they had been captured as

civilians, the saboteurs were tried by a military tribunal
composed by President Roosevelt, under the rules of court
martial for military personnel.

It was the aim of the

Justice and War Departments to subject these confessed
agents of an enemy nation to the law of war; that being a
secret military trial and a certain death verdict, neither
of which could be guaranteed by the civil courts.

The court

that judged the eight saboteurs consisted of three major
generals and three brigadier generals under the leadership
of Major General Frank R. McCoy.

The prosecution was led by

Attorney General Francis Biddle and the Army's Judge
Advocate General, Major General Myron Cramer.

The defense

counsel consisted of Colonel Cassius Dowell and Colonel
Kenneth Royall, with Colonel Carl Ristine appointed as
counsel for George Dasch, since Dasch was certain to testify
against the others.
All eight men were described in the official charges
as being in "Violation of the Law of War," that is, that
they acted on behalf of Germany to sabotage war materials
and industries in the United States.

The second charge was

the "Violation of the Blst Article of War," which stated
that the saboteurs had relieved or attempted to relieve
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enemies of the United States, and had given intelligence to
enemies of the United States.

The third charge, "Violation

of the 82nd Article of War," concerned spying, and accused
the eight men of acting as spies for the German government.
The fourth charge accused them of conspiracy to commit the
first three crimes. (43)
Because the United States was at war and because of
the method and manner in which the trial was arranged and
conducted, it was almost a foregone conclusion that the
would-be saboteurs would be found guilty and receive the
death penalty.

Their confessions and the discovery of the

crates of explosives brought from Germany to destroy and
disrupt American war production--all documented by the
press--certainly insured a wide-spread belief in their
criminality days before the trial began.

Nevertheless the

defense counsels for both Dasch and the other seven
defendants did their best to counter the charges levied by
the prosecution.
Colonel Ristine's defense of Dasch was based primarily
on Dasch's voluntary confession and cooperation with the
FBI.

Colonels Royall and Dowell stressed the fact that

their clients had committed no acts of sabotage and tried to
establish that they had had no intention of carrying out the
mission entrusted to them by the German Abwehr.

Royall also

questioned the validity of the military commission formed by
President Roosevelt, which in essence suspended the writ of
habeas corpus and denied the eight men a trial by civil

----1
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court.

Royall maintained that the crimes with which the

saboteurs were charged were covered by civil statutes, and
thus the men were due a trial in civil court.

That they

were not so tried effected a challenge to both their civil
rights and the American Constitution.
Royall informed the President, the military
commission, and the prosecution of his intention to apply
for writs of habeas corpus and to test the legality of the
military trial and the President's war powers in forming the
military tribunal.

Royall was well aware that his

appointment had been made by the same authority that created
the military commission, yet he felt he could not compromise
in the defense of the Germans over a procedure which he felt
was legally questionable.

Royall wanted the President to

grant either him and Dowell, or other individuals, the
authority to pursue the matter as far as it could go. (44)
The President was noncommittal.

It was relayed via

the President's secretary that Royall and Dowell would have
to make their own decisions as to the scope of their
authority. (45)

Royall and Dowell responded:

We ..• are of the opinion that we are authorized,
and our duty requires us, first, to try to arrange
for civil counsel to institute the proceedings
necessary .•• and second, if such arrangements cannot
be made, to institute such proceedings at the
appropriate time.
Unless ordered otherwise, we will
act accordingly.(46)
It was Royall's hope to convince the United States
Supreme Court to convene in special session to receive
requests for a writ of habeas corpus, which if granted,
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would put the saboteurs under the jurisdiction of the civil
courts.

The foundation for Royall's request was in the

Supreme Court decision of 1866 in "Ex parte Milligan," which
ruled that a civilian could not be tried by a military
commission unless martial law had been declared, or the
civil courts were not in operation. (47)

Milligan, a

resident of Indiana during the Civil War, was accused of
conspiring against the United States.

His activities

considered dangerous to the North were: inciting to
insurrection; communicating with the enemy; giving aid and
comfort to the enemy; conspiring to seize munitions of war
and to free prisoners of war; and resisting the draft.
Milligan was tried before a military court established under
the authority of President Lincoln after he had suspended
the writ of habeas corpus.

Though convicted, Milligan was

awarded a writ of habeas corpus by the Supreme Court and a
trial in civil court. (48)

In the Milligan case, the Supreme

Court held that neither the President nor Congress had the
power to set up military tribunals except in the actual
theater of war where the civil courts were no longer
functioning. (49)

It was Royall's argument that American

justice and legal rights applied to the German
saboteurs--agents of an enemy in time of war--as much as to
any American citizen.
The court agreed to meet on July 29, and Royall made
his formal application for writs of habeas corpus on July 28
to the District Court in Washington, D.C., since the Supreme
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Court would only hear the case on appeal from a lower court.
Colonel Ristine did not feel that Dasch would benefit from
an appeal to the Supreme Court and declined to join in the
appeal, therefore escaping the adverse publicity and
personal attacks visited upon Royall and Dowell.
One letter to Royall implied threats of violence and
suggested that Royall stay out of his home state of North
Carolina after the war. (50)

One woman wrote that the appeal

to the Supreme Court on behalf of the saboteurs made a
mockery of the United States, but added: "It is one way to
kill Hitler.

He must be dying of laughter right now."(51)

A milder reprimand came from The New Republic, which
stated:
Even in wartime and even toward the enemy we do
not abandon our basic protection of individual
rights. Where should America show its greatest
strength? In assuming every possible legal recourse
to the enemy or striking at the heart of the enemy's
power and destroying him? The legal tradition will
not win the war for the United States. (52)
The New York Times wrote:
The decision to seek recourse in the Supreme Court
did not meet popular approval in Washington. On the
contrary there is great dissatisfaction here with
the length to which the trial has already proceeded.
Complainants recognize the duty of the Army Colonels
to demand all possible rights for the saboteurs but
none the less there was a feeling of disappointment
that further steps would be taken on their behalf.
On all sides hope was expressed that the Supreme
Court would make short work of the move. (53)
Royall also received positive reinforcement for his
efforts to insure that the seven saboteurs received the
justice he felt they deserved under the Constitution.

His
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desire to test the legality of the military trial and his
efforts on behalf of his clients undoubtedly had much to do
with the Court's decision to meet in special session.
Royall's case was a test of the principles of American
justice, and there was a great deal of interest among the
justices and ordinary citizens as to how the case would be
argued.
In his case before the Supreme Court, Royall based his
defense on the same argument as he had used before the
military commission: that though they had the equipment to
do so, the seven men committed no act of sabotage in the
United States.

He went on to stress that neither the coast

of Long Island or Florida could be construed as a zone of
military operations, and that only Congress had the right to
suspend the writ of habeas corpus, and then only in case of
rebellion or invasion. (54)

Most important of all, Royall

emphasized the precedent established in "Ex parte Milligan,"
which stated:
Martial law cannot arise from a threatened
invasion. The necessity must be actual and present;
the invasion real, such as effectually closes the
courts and deposes the civil administration. (55)
For Royall's case to be successful, he had to convince
the Supreme Court that the trial of the saboteurs was
illegal under the Constitution, that the President of the
United States had gone beyond his legal powers in forming
the military commission, and that the crimes the men were
charged with came under civil statutes.
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Despite his ingenious defense, Royall was questioned
by the Supreme Court and challenged by Attorney General
Biddle over the definition of the location of a theater of
wartime operations.

Justice Frankfurter asked: "Cannot the

enemy determine what the theater of operations is by being
the aggressor?"(56)
As prosecutor, Biddle maintained that the entire east
coast of the United States was a theater of operations, and
cited the sinking of merchant ships off the coast and the
landing of the German saboteurs as proof.

The fact that

Nazi Germany and the United States were at war was
conclusive enough for Biddle that the arrival of the
saboteurs was an act of invasion and should be treated as
such.

"Ex parte Milligan" did not pertain to the case,

according to Biddle, since Milligan, as opposed to the
saboteurs, never wore an enemy uniform, nor was he a
resident of a state in rebellion during the Civil War.
For Biddle, the major issue before the Supreme Court
was whether or not the President had acted legally in
causing the eight Germans to be tried by a military court.
He felt the President was perfectly within his rights as
Commander-in-Chief to give up the eight men to a military
trial, and cited as precedent a law passed by Congress in
1798, which stated:
Whenever there is a declared war and the President
makes a public proclamation of the event, all
natives, citizens, denizens or subjects of the
hostile nation ••• shall be liable to be apprehended,
restrained, secured and removed as alien
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enemies. ( 5 7)
Biddle felt the authority of the President included
the power to bar these enemy aliens from the civil courts.
In fact, Biddle indicated his belief that the Court should
consider repealing that part of "Ex parte Milligan," which
stated that military commissions could not be established
for civilians unless martial law had been declared or the
civil courts were not functioning.

He felt the case

interfered with " ..• the appropriate execution of orders of
the Commander-in-Chief."(58)
Biddle's concluding remarks accurately summed up his
own feelings and the position of the administration:
The United States and Nazi Germany are fighting a
war to determine which of the two shall survive.
This case is no more important than a small
skirmish, but on an important front.
It is part of
the business of war. Military trial for the
petitioners endangers no traditional civil liberty.
These German soldiers have already been given rights
which no American would receive in Germany, and now
ask for Constitutional privileges which we do not
allow our own soldiers. (59)
The hearing before the Supreme Court lasted just two
days.

On Friday, July 31, the decision was read without the

usual accompanying opinion which, in the interest of time,
would come later.

The Court unanimously decided that the

crimes with which the saboteurs were charged were sufficient
cause for the President to authorize their trial by military
commission. (60)

Therefore, President Roosevelt's military

tribunal was legal under the Constitution, and the plea for
writs of habeas corpus for the seven men were denied.
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It was not until October 29, 1942, that the full
opinion of "Ex parte Quirin" was released.

In it the

Supreme Court affirmed the right of the President to have
appointed a military commission to try the saboteurs,
because the eight men were examples of "unlawful combatants"
as opposed to "lawful combatants."

"Lawful combatants"

would have worn uniforms and would have been held as
prisoners-of-war. (61)

Since the saboteurs had worn civilian

clothes and had come "with hostile purpose"--that is with
crates of explosives--across the battleground of the
Atlantic and the boundaries of America, Royall's defense
that the men had committed no act of sabotage was not
accepted by the Court. (62)

To the Court, the demeanor and

furtive methods of the saboteurs bespoke their belligerence
and guilt.
After the Supreme Court's decision, there was little
doubt as to what the outcome of the military trial would be.
Yet, even through his closing statement, Royall continued to
emphasize what he had throughout his defense: that the men
had not committed any act of sabotage, and it was doubtful
that they would have.

For Kerling, Quirin, Thiel, Neubauer,

and Heinck, Royall probably expected a guilty verdict, but
hoped for a prison term.

In the case of Herbert Haupt,

Royall stressed Haupt's youth and the circumstances under
which he had left the United States.

Haupt had not

purposefully left the United States for Germany, but had
gone to Mexico after learning of his girlfriend's pregnancy.
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Royall stated that working with Walter Kappe and the Abwehr
was merely Haupt's way of getting back to America. (63)
Peter Burger probably made the best impression of the
eight at the trial due primarily to the manner in which he
conducted himself and answered questions.

Royall felt that

Peter Burger deserved leniency because of his appearance as
a witness for the prosecution. (64)

The fact that he had

been arrested by the Gestapo also struck a responsive chord
with those before whom he testified because it made him
appear to be a dissident of the Third Reich.

Royall used

the anti-Nazi attitude attributed to Burger as the reason
behind Burger's desire to leave Germany in any way
opportunity provided.
Ristine's closing summary on the behalf of George
Dasch reiterated Dasch's aid to the FBI and the part he
played in the arrest of the other seven saboteurs.

Ristine

sought an acquittal on all the charges, and in a different
year, Dasch might have received both the acquittal and the
hero's accolades he felt he deserved.

But in 1942, the

appearance of eight German saboteurs in a nation at war
decreed otherwise.

In the era of the "total" war, the

United States could not afford to be tolerant of its
enemies, nor would the country allow it.

Roosevelt's

selection of the military commission, its method and secrecy
were all part of a process to insure that all eight men
received the death penalty.
The trial ended on Saturday, August 1, and on Monday,
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August 3, the military commission reached a verdict and
reconvened to inform the prosecution, defense, and the
prisoners, not what the verdict was, but only that one had
been reached.

This same style of secrecy had been

maintained throughout the trial; in fact the trial
transcript remained a classified government document until
1960.

It was up to President Roosevelt to consider the

commission's recommendations and decide the final verdict.
The defendants were not allowed the right of appeal.
On Saturday, August 8, 1942, Edward Kerling, Heinrich
Heinck, Richard Quirin, Werner Thiel, Herbert Haupt, and
Hermann Neubauer were electrocuted in the Washington, D.C.
jail.

It was only after their death that the nation learned

of the military commission's findings and President
Roosevelt's verdict.

All eight saboteurs were found guilty

and sentenced to death.

However, the commission recommended

a commutation of sentence for George Dasch and Peter Burger
because of their cooperation as government witnesses.
Burger was sentenced to life imprisonment, and Dasch
received thirty years. (65)
After the executions, there were associated trials of
those whom the government accused of helping the eight
saboteurs.

Herbert Haupt's parents and his aunt and uncle

were tried for treason in Chicago, along with the parents of
Wolfgang Wergin, the friend with whom Haupt had originally
left the United States.

Peter Burger testified against them

as the government's major witness.

All were found guilty,
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the men sentenced to death, the women to twenty-five years
and $10,000 fines.

However, after appeals the women were

found not guilty, Wergin and Freehling received five years,
and Haupt was sentenced to life imprisonment and a $10,000
fine. ( 6 6)
In New York, Burger also testified against Anthony
Cramer, to whom Thiel had given his money belt for safe
keeping.

Cramer was sentenced to forty-five years, but

appealed all the way to the Supreme Court where the verdict
was overruled.

Cramer was finally sentenced to six years

for trading with the enemy.

Hermann Faje had taken Heinrich

Heinck's money and received five years for trading with the
enemy.

Edward Kerling's girlfriend, Hedwig Engemann, and

Helmut Leiner, whom Kerling had contacted as a reliable
source of help, were both convicted of concealing their
knowledge of the saboteurs in America.

Engemann received

three years and Leiner was sentenced to eighteen, but was
paroled in 1954. (67)
George Dasch and Peter Burger served only a fraction
of their respective prison terms.

In April, 1948, President

Truman commuted their sentences and the two men were
deported to Germany. (68)

Presumably by 1948 the crimes for

which Burger and Dasch had been convicted were not taken as
seriously as they had been in 1942.

Certainly immediately

after the saboteurs were caught, public opinion raged
against them, demanding death as the only fitting
punishment.

After the arrest of the eight saboteurs and the

l
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execution of six of their number, sabotage in America became
something to guard against with increasing vigilance.

The

public was warned that " .•• the Germans will try again--next
time perhaps not by a landing on our coasts but by some new
route!"(69)

"Patriotic citizens" were encouraged to take

"defensive counterespionage" measures in their speech and
written communications and in the overall conduct of their
daily lives to aid in the struggle against enemy agents. (70)
But by this time, the United States was more prepared
to battle the total war strategy practiced by the enemy.
The Nazis were still consistently portrayed as brutal
evildoers, but fifth columnists, saboteurs, and spies were
acknowledged with less of a shock then they had been in the
Abwehr's early days in America.

And perhaps most

importantly, in late 1942, the initiative was just beginning
to pass to America and its allies.

Americans were dealing

with a more positive vein of war news following the
execution of the six German agents and the internment of
Dasch and Burger than they had when the arrests were first
made public.

But, if the United States and its allies had

experienced severe and consistent losses throughout most of
the war, it is probable that Dasch and Burger would either
have been executed or would have stayed in prison much
longer.
By 1948, when Dasch and Burger were released,
attitudes toward who the foe was had changed.

The country

was deeply involved in the Cold war and concerned over the
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containment of Soviet expansion.
saboteurs had been "the enemy."

In 1942, the eight
In 1948, Burger and Dasch

were merely extra baggage left over from an incident that
had lost much of its significance; who were remembered only
to be released, deported, and forgotten.
The Abwehr learned of the dissolution of Operation
Pastorius when J. Edgar Hoover announced the arrests of the
eight German agents.

General Lahousen, the head of the

Abwehr's sabotage division wrote:
•.• we have been receiving Reuter reports of
American radio transmission announcing the arrest of
all participants in Operation Pastorius, some in New
York and some in Chicago. The reports give the
correct location of the landings in the United
States and of the targets for the planned sabotage
operations. (71)
The failure of Operation Pastorius, coming no more than a
year after the Abwehr had suffered the humiliating Sebold
affair, hurt the status of the Abwehr in Germany.

The

inefficiency of Admiral Canaris' intelligence organization
had become more apparent, and it was clear it had blundered
particularly in its choice of agents.
In 1941, William Sebold had double-crossed the Abwehr
and an entire network was uncovered by the FBI.

Now a year

later the Abwehr had been stung by treachery again, this
time in the person of George Dasch, who ambitiously sought
to emulate Sebold's actions.

Unfortunately for Canaris and

his service, the United States was not the only site of
Abwehr failures.

Within the Abwehr's files were a number of

code-name missions which, like Pastorius, were unsuccessful.

~
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Operation "Weisdorn" was to be an incitement of a popular
uprising in South Africa; Operation "Tiger" the incitement
of Afghanistan and Western India against the British;
Operation "Shamyl" the instigation of an anti-Soviet revolt
in the Caucasus--none of which proved triumphant for the
Abwehr. (72)

Instead, the miscarriage of these missions

bespoke Abwehr incompetence and in the long run, a marked
inability to get the job done right.
Though the Abwehr's chief antagonist, Reinhard
Heydrich, had been assassinated in Czechoslovakia and had
died on June 4, 1942, both the Abwehr and Canaris had no
lack of critics or enemies.

The Abwehr had undergone severe

cuts to its authority when, prior to Heydrich's death, he
and Canaris signed an agreement which increased the powers
of the RSHA at the expense of the Abwehr.

In March, 1942,

the RSHA took over all political intelligence services
abroad and part of the Abwehr's counterespionage field. (73)
In addition to this loss of power and its failures abroad,
the Abwehr was unable to meet the general staff's demands
for more information concerning the enemy's battle plans,
especially in the Russian and North African campaigns. (74)
Abwehr intelligence forwarded to the Foreign Armies Sections
for final evaluation was often received critically. (75)
Consequently the general staff evaluators believed they
could do a better job than the Abwehr in gathering and
appraising information pertaining to the enemy, and as a
result began taking over some of the Abwehr's sources of
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information, among them the Abwehr's Main Post East,
codenamed "Walli I."(76)
The Abwehr had other problems that hampered its
attempt to stay afloat and functioning in the Third Reich.
Before his death, Heydrich had indicated to Hitler and
Himmler apparent ties the Abwehr seemed to have with the
anti-Nazi resistance. (77)

The Abwehr had played host to a

number of opponents to the Nazi regime, providing them with
an ideal cover.

Among these were Hans Oster, head of the

Abwehr's "Zentralgruppe," and Helmut Groscurth, the head of
Abwehr II until 1939.

Both of these men were part of the

military's plan--headed by Chief of the General Staff Franz
Halder--to overthrow Hitler during the Czechoslovakian
crisis in 1938; a proposed coup to which Admiral Canaris was
evidently receptive. (78)
Though Canaris rededicated himself to the regime
following Hitler's success at the Munich Conference, he
joined in the planning of another "coup d'etat" in late
1939.

This coup was organized primarily to eliminate Hitler

and thereby avoid mounting an offensive in the West, an
attack which Canaris and others felt would sever important
ties with Western Europe and bind Germany closer to
Russia. (79)

The circle had enlarged and included not only

General Halder, but the man whom he had replaced, Ludwig
Beck.

aster's circle also included the ex-mayor of Leipzig,

Carl Goedeler, and "Reichsgerichtsrat" Hans von Dohnanyi, a
high official in the judiciary who manned desk "ZB"--Foreign
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Policy Reports--in aster's department, and maintained
contact with the Christian resistance circles through his
brother-in-law, Pastor Dietrich Bonhoeffer. (80)
The coup failed to materialize and the offensive
against Western Europe took place.

This aborted coup marked

the end of Admiral Canaris' active participation with the
resistance, though he was undoubtedly conscious of
resistance plans and intrigue within the Oster circle. (81)
By March of 1942, Oster was busy again with renewed plans
for a "coup d'etat" along with retired General Beck and
officers from Army Group Center in Russia, including Fabian
von Schlabrendorff and Colonel Henning von Tresckow.

This

group fomented the tactical plan that the July 20, 1944,
assassination attempt on Hitler was to follow. (82)
The strong indications that the Abwehr was infested
with "traitors" lent credence and power to those who would
see the Abwehr dissolved or put under a different
department.

The specter of conspiracy in the Abwehr,

coupled with what many saw as its declining effectiveness,
simply added to already strong criticism against Canaris and
his entire organization.

If the Abwehr had to deal with the

competition and intrigue instigated by its rivals, and the
political dissension and lack of internal cohesion within
its own ranks, how effective could their performance in the
intelligence war have been?

Put in this light, the vain

attempt to install German saboteurs in America in June,
1942, was a crucial failure to the Abwehr and its existence
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under Admiral Canaris, and had a great deal of influence on
future Abwehr actions in the United States.
In his book, They Came To Kill, Eugene Rachlis said
of Operation Pastorius:
At the time it was conceived, the plan was logical
in terms of the Nazis' military superiority in
Europe. But not long after the failure of the
saboteurs, Hitler and the German High Command had to
contend with major defeats in Russia and Africa.
It
is not likely that any new plans from Abwehr II,
even had they been suggested, would have received
high priority. (83)
Rachlis could have easily added that the Abwehr's
institutional health and loyalty were so faulty and
questionable that chances are, it could not have
successfully mounted any sort of sabotage operation, nor
would it have been asked.

The controversial status of the

Abwehr, following Operation Pastorius, had much to do with
the subsequent lack of Abwehr-inspired offensives in
America.

Admiral Canaris and his organization never again

mounted a sabotage operation of this size against the United
States.
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CHAPTER VII
THE FINAL REMNANT
The collapse of the Abwehr's large spy networks in the
summer of 1941 came at a time when the Abwehr was greatly in
need of information from America.

Just a few months after

the arrest of the Ludwig and Duquesne rings, the Japanese
attacked Pearl Harbor and the United States was propelled
into what had become another World War.

The number of

Abwehr agents who had operated up through the summer of 1941
was sharply reduced.

The FBI had arrested large numbers of

spies, and only a few escaped the net and continued to
operate.

Among these was Simon Emil Koedel, who weathered

America's spy scares and worked for Germany from 1936 until
1944. (1)
Koedel was older than the majority of Abwehr spies, a
few days short of his sixty-third birthday at the time of
his arrest.

Koedel was born in Bavaria in 1881 and came to

the United States in 1904.

He served in the United States

Army from 1908 to 1911, and after his discharge became a
naturalized American citizen. (2)
Ladislas Farago, author of The Game of Foxes, called
Koedel " ••. the best all-round spy the Abwehr had in the
United States--in two world wars."(3)

Farago wrote that

Koedel began his spying in America when the First World War
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began by watching and reporting on ships and harbor
activities.

He went to England to collect military

intelligence, but was arrested and deported back to the
United States.

Farago claimed Koedel "somehow" reached

Germany, obtained the rank of Captain and worked in
intelligence.

When Hitler took over, Koedel joined his

" •.• new crop of intelligence officers," all the time holding
on to his American citizenship. (4)
The FBI report on Koedel agreed that he was involved
in some sort of espionage work during World War I, but
intimated that it was only in Britain and not the United
States.

According to the FBI report, Koedel had to have

been back in the United States shortly after the war, since
a three-year-old daughter was adopted in 1921 by Koedel and
his American-born wife.

The FBI also stated that Koedel

became a motion picture projectionist and operated his own
theater.

In 1933, Koedel divorced his first wife and

remarried. (5)

The information from the Bureau seems to

suggest that Koedel remained in the United States following
his deportation from Great Britain.
Sources agree however, that it was sometime in the
middle thirties that Koedel volunteered his services to
"Abwehrnebenstelle" Bremen to act as a spy against the
United States. (6)

Though Koedel had retained his American

citizenship, he stated: "I love Germany with all my heart
and I am even willing •.• to give my very life for her."(7)
Koedel was trained by spymasters at the Bremen subpost and
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returned to America as a "sleeper" agent.

He established a

residence in Manhattan, and on a monthly salary of $200 a
month plus expenses, explored and consolidated intelligence
resources he would use on behalf of the Abwehr. (8)
To obtain intelligence in the United States, Koedel
adopted a technique that appeared to be free from
evasiveness and therefore was rarely questioned.

Koedel

applied for membership in the American Ordnance Association,
a pro-defense organization comprised of armaments and
munitions producers who maintained close ties to the War
Department.

Koedel enclosed his discharge papers and

identified himself as a " .•. chemical engineer with large
stock holdings in major defense industries ••.• "{9)

He was

accepted in the AOA and put on the War Department's
confidential mailing list for all information regarding
military supplies and production.

As a member of the AOA,

Koedel was given access to all meetings and lectures of the
Association, and was allowed admittance to any defense plant
in the United States. (10)
Koedel used the stationery of the AOA to write letters
to the chairmen and members of the Military and Naval
Affairs committees in both houses of Congress, in which he
called himself "an investor with considerable stake in the
American defense industry," and asked for their help "in the
interest of our nation's preparedness and security."(11)
Senator Robert Reynolds of North Carolina, a member and
later the chairman of the Senate's Military Affairs
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committee, replied and invited Koedel to visit him in
Washington. (12)

Koedel was able to use this relationship to

his advantage later in his career when he needed a
highly-placed friend.
After Germany's invasion of Poland, Koedel was
activated as an operational agent of the Abwehr.

He used

his twenty-one-year-old adopted daughter, Marie, to help him
spy on the New York harbor and its shipping.

Koedel had his

daughter spend time with sailors and merchant seamen on the
docks and accompany them to waterfront bars, where she would
attempt to gain information on convoys and cargoes leaving
the United States.

Marie's duties included a daily ride on

the Staten Island ferry from which she could observe ships
in the harbor and what they were loading or unloading.

She

also typed reports for Koedel which relayed the intelligence
they had obtained to the Abwehr.(13)

To augment what Marie

discovered, Koedel sometimes dressed in the clothes of a
longshoreman and visited docks along the waterfront to watch
ships being loaded.

The name and address of the

manufacturer listed on the crates of supplies often gave
Koedel the clues he needed to conclude what kinds of
materials the ships were carrying. (14)
Koedel preferred to let his daughter handle the
waterfront while he occupied himself with the more
interesting aspects of procuring intelligence.

In December,

1939, Koedel managed to gain entrance to the United States
Army's Chemical Warfare Center at the Edgewood Arsenal in
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Bel Air, Maryland.

Twice in November, Koedel had tried to

get into Edgewood by showing his AOA card, but was turned
away.

He finally telephoned the AOA in Washington, which

called the War Department, which in turn called the Edgewood
Arsenal.

Koedel was given a guided tour on December 7,

1939, a description of which he promptly sent to Bremen. (15)
His report included as much technical data as he could
assimilate, information on the storage facilities, and even
names of the arsenal's suppliers.

He also sent labels he

peeled off boxes ready for shipment, one of which read: "25
Hand Grenades--Irritant M 7--Fuse M 200--Gas."(16)
Koedel had planned well when he first wrote to Senator
Reynolds under the auspices of the AOA.

In March of 1940,

the German General Staff was planning its invasion of France
and needed information on the French ports of Nantes and La
Rochelle, particularly whether these ports could handle
ships other than colliers and tankers.

Koedel contacted

Senator Reynolds and said he needed the information to
arrange for supply shipments to France.

Thanks to the

Senator, Koedel was able to report to Bremen that,
"according to the U.S. Maritime Commission, these ports are
not limited in their facilities, but are capable of handling
ships loading oil and coal, as well as general cargo."(17)
As an additional favor, Senator Reynolds put Koedel on the
list to receive a confidential report issued weekly by the
Munitions Board of the State Department, which listed
permits granted for the export of war material to Great
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Britain. (18)
Koedel made use of Senator Reynolds again in August,
1940, when the Abwehr asked him to obtain the passenger list
of the army transport, "American Legion," which had left
Finland bound for New York.

The transport had evidently

made an unscheduled stop in Scotland, and the Abwehr wanted
to find out what passengers boarded there.

Koedel asked

Reynolds, who wrote to the State Department and the War
Department, and asked that his Military Affairs Committee
receive the passenger list.

The War Department would not

release the list, but when Reynolds insisted, it was finally
relinquished to him.

It is not clear what Koedel told the

Senator that resulted in Koedel's knowledge of the
transport's passengers, but in December, 1940, Koedel was
able to report to the Abwehr that the "American Legion" had
picked up no passengers in Scotland. (19)
Marie's success on the waterfront was used by Koedel
to augment the information he sent to the Abwehr.

Through

the sailors and merchantmen she dated, Marie was able to
provide Koedel with enough intelligence to write two reports
for the German Navy.

The first was entitled: "Report

Concerning American Ships Inspected by England on Suspicion
of Contraband."

The second: "Report on the Conduct of Enemy

Ships in Convoy at Sea in the Atlantic, Based on
Conversations with British Seamen."(20)

The second report

was assembled with the help of Duncan Scott-Ford, a British
sailor who had jumped ship in New York and was picked up by
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Marie Koedel.

Scott-Ford evidently volunteered himself as a

spy for the Abwehr, and was highly recommended by Simon
Koedel.

This former British sailor went to work in Lisbon,

where his knowledge of British convoy routes made him a
welcome addition to the Abwehr's shipping expert in
Portugal.

Scott-Ford was hanged by the British in November,

1942. (21)
The reason Simon Koedel was able to operate for so
long in the United States, and why he was able to escape the
purge of Abwehr agents precipitated by the FBI plant,
William Sebold, was singularly simple: Koedel did not use a
radio to send his intelligence to Germany.

Officers of the

Bremen subpost had not allowed their agents to send
intelligence through "Tramp."

Thus Koedel was not involved

with Sebold's radio or the communications center of Axel
Wheeler-Hill, both of which were compromised because of
Sebold's involvement with the FBI.
For convoy and shipping intelligence that needed quick
transfer to Germany, Koedel used the cable facilities and
the Enigma coding machine of the German Consulate in New
York. (22)

All other intelligence obtained by Koedel went

through the mail, and was thus subject to the scrutiny of
British censors, who in the past, had uncovered Guenther
Rumrich and Kurt Ludwig.

To thwart the censors, Koedel made

use of his AOA affiliations by using the same envelopes the
War Department sent to AOA members.

Apparently Koedel

adapted these envelopes to send his intelligence to the
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Abwehr via a mail drop in Milan, correctly assuming that the
censors would not suspect the official-looking government
envelopes. (23)
The espionage career of Simon Koedel eventually came
to an end.

From 1935 to 1943, Koedel worked as a

projectionist at the Lyric Theater in New York City.
Evidently his co-workers entertained suspicions because of
letters bearing foreign addresses Koedel brought with him to
the projectionist's booth.

Apparently Koedel received

communications from Germany and from other Abwehr agents and
hid them in an old stairway at the theater.

Additional

doubts about Koedel grew among his fellow employees when a
section of film about a new airplane was cut from a
newsreel.
nothing.

A search of the projectionist's booth revealed
The missing film was later found by Koedel while

working alone in the booth; a discovery the FBI thought
" .•. made it appear that it had actually been in his
possession."(24)
In 1943, Koedel left New York for Harper's Ferry,
Virginia, where he found work as a projectionist.

It is not

known whether his daughter continued her espionage
activities on the New York waterfront, though chances are
she did not.

Koedel was reportedly a tough man to work for,

in addition to being a stern father and a severe
disciplinarian.

He often hit Marie or beat her with his

belt if he felt she was lazy or slow in performing her
duties.(25)

Koedel's attitude toward his daughter was not
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one to induce love and affection, nor did it insure filial
loyalty.

Thus, unfortunately for Simon Koedel, Marie told

all to a boyfriend who told a friend who eventually went to
the FBI.

Koedel was arrested on October 23, 1944, in

Harper's Ferry.

Marie was arrested later that same day. (26)

Simon and Marie Koedel were indicted for conspiracy to
violate the Peacetime Espionage Statute.

Apparently the FBI

accused them of spying for the enemy only from 1939 to 1941,
either not knowing about or ignoring their activities in
other years.

Consequently, even though they were arrested

in wartime, their espionage work came under peacetime
regulations. (27)

There was no threat of the death penalty

for the Koedels, and Simon was not about to fill anyone in
on what they had been doing since October, 1941, nor was he
anxious for the FBI to find out about the more than six
hundred messages he successfully sent to the Abwehr. (28)
Thus, Koedel was quick to plead guilty after the trial began
on February 7, 1945.

Marie Koedel was found guilty by a

jury on February 19.

They were both sentenced on March 1,

1945, Marie to seven years and six months and her father to
fifteen years. (29)
Though Koedel was arrested and sentenced to serve a
prison term, he fared better than the Abwehr which had
fostered and subsidized his espionage activity.

The

numerous failures attributed to the Abwehr were paraded
before Hitler by his henchmen, and by late 1943, the
Abwehr's incompetence was a common theme when Hitler
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discussed Canaris and his organization. (30)

In January,

1944, a series of events turned the tides of fate
permanently against Admiral Canaris and the Abwehr.
On January 12, 1944, the members of an anti-Hitler
group called the Solf circle were arrested by the Gestapo.
Among those taken in was Major Otto Kiep of the Ausland
branch of the Abwehr. (31)
In late January, 1944, the German Army commanders were
anxious about an Allied landing behind German lines and were
particularly interested in what the Abwehr knew about enemy
plans.

When Admiral Canaris visited the headquarters of the

Commander-in-Chief Southwest, on January 21, 1944, he stated
that the Abwehr contemplated no Allied landing in the near
future.

Just hours later the Allies landed at Anzio, fifty

miles behind German lines. (32)

Needless to say, this did

little to enhance the reputation of Canaris or the Abwehr.
Finally on January 27, 1944, Dr. Erich Vermehren, a member
of the "Abwehrstelle" in Istanbul, and his wife, defected to
the British. (33)
It was this last incident that broke the proverbial
camel's back for Canaris and the Abwehr.

On February 11,

1944, Wilhelm Canaris was relieved as head of the Abwehr.
The following day a directive was issued from the Fuhrer's
headquarters which stated that a unified German intelligence
service was to be formed under the command of Heinrich
Himmler.

As an independent organization, the Abwehr was

finished. (34)
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The head of Abwehr I, Colonel Georg Hansen, who had
taken over from Piekenbrock in 1943, was put in charge of
the Abwehr during reorganization.

Canaris' name was taken

off the active list and he was directed to Burg Lauenstein
in Thuringia under what was essentially house arrest.
However, by the end of June, 1944, Canaris was again made
available for duty and Hitler appointed him head of the
OKW's special staff for mercantile warfare and economic
combat measures. (35)
Canaris had little time to enjoy his new appointment.
On July 20, 1944, Colonel Count Claus Schenk von
Stauffenberg arrived at the Fuhrer's headquarters in East
Prussia to attend the daily conference.

The bomb he carried

in his briefcase failed to kill Hitler, and nearly 5000
people were executed and some 7000 arrested by the Gestapo
as a result of the failed assassination attempt. (36)
Canaris knew of the plot, but did not take part.

He

did not get along personally with Stauffenberg and
disapproved of what he felt were the leftist leanings and
amateur conduct of some Stauffenberg group members.

For

their part, the July 20 plotters found Canaris too
conservative and of little importance to be actively
involved or informed. (37)

Canaris did not even know the

date of the portended military coup.

When he received the

call on the afternoon of July 20, informing him of Hitler's
supposed death, Canaris' first response was, "Dead?
God, who did it--the Russians?"(38)

Good

However, Canaris was
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arrested on July 23, after being implicated by Abwehr I's
Colonel Hansen, who had actively conspired with Stauffenberg
and others in the military coup.
Further interrogations and confessions vaguely linked
Canaris to the resistance, particularly to the Oster group.
What tied Canaris inexorably to the anti-Nazis was the
discovery of the Oster circle's papers on September 22,
1944, which were hidden at the Abwehr's wartime headquarters
at Camp Zeppelin in Zossen on the outskirts of Berlin. (39)
These papers evidenced that the conspiracy against Hitler
had begun long before the war; some of the material dated
from as early as 1938, when a military coup was first
contemplated. (40)

The Zossen papers, indiscreetly preserved

by Hans von Dohnanyi, were exposed by the Gestapo.

This

proved disastrous for a number of Abwehr and military
officers who had contributed their ideas and names to the
resistance against Hitler.

The papers were the proof long

sought by the Gestapo of Canaris' "treachery" and
effectively sealed his fate.
Thus by October, 1944, when Simon Koedel was arrested,
the Abwehr he knew had been abolished.

June 1, 1944, was

the official date of dissolution for the Abwehr.

Abwehr I

and II were consolidated to form a separate Military
Department--or "Amt Mil" in its abbreviated form--and
transferred to the RSHA.

Georg Hansen, the former head of

Abwehr I, was placed in charge of "Amt Mil."

After Hansen's

arrest, SS General Walter Schellenberg who headed RSHA VI,
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the Nazi Party's foreign intelligence organ, personally took
over the direction of "Amt Mil."

The Abwehr's posts and

subposts within Germany, its occupied territories, and
neutral countries were placed under control of the RSHA, as
were its front line units.

The Abwehr's budget and a number

of its civilian and military personnel were also transferred
to the RSHA.

(41)

Subsequent investigation of the July 20, 1944,
assassination attempt implicated some of the more highly
placed Abwehr officials.
arrested and executed.

Canaris and Hansen were both
Hans Oster, the head of the Abwehr's

Central Group, who had been relieved of his Abwehr command
late in 1943 because of his ties to the resistance, and his
friend Hans von Dohnanyi, the civilian lawyer who had
occupied the desk next door, were arrested and executed.
Colonel Wessel von Freytag-Loringhoven who took over command
of Abwehr II from General Lahousen, and Colonel Werner
Schrader, a member of the Abwehr's Special Duties Section
and of the Oster Circle, committed suicide. (42)

Many other

individuals either directly or indirectly involved with the
Abwehr were implicated in the assassination attempt,
arrested, and executed.

What was left of the Abwehr after

its absorption into the RSHA was struck a severe blow.
Ultimately all of Germany's intelligence functions were
assigned to the uncoordinated, chaotic, and by then
tottering Nazi party.
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CHAPTER VIII
A LAST EFFORT
There was a final episode of German espionage
activity against the United States following the Abwehr's
fall.

This last mission was arranged under the auspices of

the office of Walter Schellenberg, who directed RSHA VI and
"Amt Mil"--the remnants of the Abwehr.

In late 1944, RSHA

VI landed two agents off the coast of Maine.

Their job was

to obtain technical and scientific data from the United
States--anything that would aid Germany's deteriorating
military condition.
By 1944, Germany's war effort was in trouble.

Its

ally Italy had surrendered unconditionally on September 23,
1943, following the Allied invasion of the Italian mainland.
Italy had then joined the Allies as a co-belligerent, and a
combined force of British and Americans was fighting its way
up the Italian boot.

In the east, the Soviets were on the

offensive and were recapturing much of the territory they
had lost earlier to the Germans.

Germany was vitally in

need of technical intelligence to help its faltering
military situation, and Schellenberg knew the best place to
acquire advanced data on ships, airplanes, rockets,
engineering, and scientific discoveries was in America.
German agencies were receiving some information from the

The
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United States and South America, but it was not enough and
the delays were too long. (1)
Apparently the first request for a mission to the
United States had come to Schellenberg from Joachim von
Ribbentrop, the German Foreign Minister.

Ribbentrop wanted

a source in the United States to gather and relay American
political intelligence back to Germany, and also a source to
judge the effect of German radio propaganda on the American
public during the 1944 presidential campaign. (2)
Schellenberg's priorities for the mission were different,
but as an end result, both men wanted the same thing: the
landing of an agent or agents in the United States,
subsequent infiltration into American life, and finally the
acquisition of a great deal of important intelligence for
Germany.
Schellenberg was ever aware of the abortive eight-man
Abwehr mission to the United States in 1942, and sought to
overcome the frailties inherent in an operation of this
type, which he felt the Abwehr had overlooked or succumbed
to.

The choice of agents was a particularly important

element; a decision that had to be made with the utmost care
and consideration.

This vital process was put in the hands

of SS Major Theodor Paeffgen who directed Group D of RSHA VI
and supervised spying in America.

Paeffgen looked for

candidates within the files of the Nazi Party's
"Auslandsorganisation" or AO, the organization which united
all party members abroad. (3)

The "Auslandsorganisation"
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also served as an information source about the countries in
which various members lived, since each AO leader forwarded
a monthly report concerning the economic, military, and
political situation of his respective host country. (4)

The

two men finally selected were William Colepaugh and Erich
Gimpel.
Colepaugh was born in Niantic, Connecticut, in 1918.
An American of American-born parents, Colepaugh's only tie
to Germany came from his mother's immigrant parents.

He

attended the Massachusetts Institute of Technology where he
studied naval architecture and engineering before flunking
out in early 1941. (5)
After the war began in Europe, Colepaugh revealed a
fascination with Nazi Germany and its methods of war that
was, perhaps, not unusual for a young man of his age and
interests.

However, Colepaugh went further than necessary

and began acquainting himself with German consulate
officials in Boston, and the crew of the German tanker
"Pauline Friedrich" that was tied up at Battery Wharf in
Boston.
In late May, 1940, Customs Guards stationed around
Battery Wharf reported to the FBI that Colepaugh had made
statements indicating an interest in going to Germany to
study engineering, and also that he was unhappy in the
United States and wished to leave the country. (6)

When

Colepaugh was asked why he wanted to spend time with Germans
on a German ship, he replied that they were "nice" to him
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and that he liked them better than people in the United
States. (7)

Because Colepaugh made many visits to the

"Pauline Friedrich," invited crew members to his home in
Niantic, and for a time lived and worked on board the
tanker, the FBI initiated an investigation of him in June,
1940. (8)
While still at school, Colepaugh received a great deal
of propaganda material from the German consul in Boston,
Herbert Scholz, and from German news agencies in New York.
In addition, he made a number of visits to the Boston
Consulate in early 1941.(9)
On May 7, 1941, Colepaugh went to Canada, shipped
aboard the British freighter "Reynolds," and sailed for
Scotland.

Colepaugh had evidently been enlisted by Scholz

to bring back information on British convoys, however by the
time he returned, all German consulates in America had been
closed. (10)

In September, 1941, he shipped out of New York

on the Swedish ship "Anita," which sailed for Rio de
Janeiro.

In Buenos Aires he was unable to get permission

from authorities there to join the German army. (11)
Back in America in July, 1942, a warrant was issued
for Colepaugh's arrest for violating the Selective Training
and Service Act.

Colepaugh had failed to keep his draft

board advised of his address, which was a violation of
federal law and came under the jurisdiction of the FBI. (12)
He was advised by the United States Attorney in Boston that
he would not be prosecuted if he volunteered for military
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service; consequently Colepaugh enlisted in the Navy.
However, by June of 1943, the FBI was advised that Colepaugh
had been honorably discharged "for the good of the service."
Undoubtedly Colepaugh's pro-German sympathies had not been
popular with his fellow apprentice seamen. (13)
In January, 1944, Colepaugh obtained employment on the
Swedish liner "Gripsholm," and dutifully informed his draft
board.

In Lisbon, Colepaugh jumped ship and went to the

German consulate to find out if he could go to Germany.
Colepaugh explained his relationship with the former German
consul in Boston, his trip for Scholz to gather information
on British convoys, and his desire to join the German army.
A few days later Colepaugh was cleared to go to Germany. (14)
RSHA VI was very interested in Colepaugh; the fact
that he was American-born would make him almost undetectable
as a spy in the United States.

However, there was always

the chance that, like Sebold, Colepaugh was a double agent
working for the Americans.

Schellenberg was determined to

avoid the mistakes of the Abwehr, and had Paeffgen spend
months checking Colepaugh's story, attitude, and actions.
Finally after numerous interviews, Colepaugh was told he
would be placed at the disposal of the Reich's Security
Service, and was sent to the SD's spy school at The Hague in
June, 1944. (15)
The second selection for the RSHA VI mission to
America was Erich Gimpel.
Berlin in 1910.

Gimpel was born in Merseburg near

From 1935 to 1942 he worked in Lima, Peru,
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for Telefunken, the German radio corporation.

While in

Lima, Gimpel was asked by a German attache to observe the
ships and cargoes going in and out of port.

When diplomatic

relations between Peru and Germany were severed, Gimpel was
interned as an enemy alien.

He was repatriated to Germany

by way of the United States, going first to Camp Kennedy in
Texas and then to Jersey City, New Jersey.

Gimpel sailed on

the Swedish vessel "Drottningholm" and arrived back in
Germany August 1, 1942. (16)
After his return to Germany, Gimpel worked for a time
designing radio transmitters.

He also served as a courier

for the Foreign Off ice between Berlin and Madrid, and
because of his knowledge of Spanish, was put to work
translating into German technical information from Spanish
newspapers and magazines.

This work brought him to the

attention of RSHA VI, and in the summer of 1944, Gimpel was
asked to go to the United States as a spy. (17)

According to

David Kahn, author of Hitler's Spies, Gimpel at first
refused to spy on America, but was finally persuaded when
the SS interviewer warned him that if Germany lost the war,
Gimpel would be forced to go to the Soviet Union because of
his technical abilities. (18)

Gimpel was sent to the spy

school at The Hague where he trained with William Colepaugh.
The spy school at The Hague was similar to the Abwehr
school which had operated outside of Brandenburg.

There

Gimpel and Colepaugh learned to handle explosives and
firearms.

Both received a great deal of physical fitness
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training, and learned to ride a motorcycle.
instruction was also included.

Political

Colepaugh was also trained

in radio communication during his two month stay at the
school. (19)

Gimpel had much of the technical knowledge and

training required and stayed only four weeks.
After their training at The Hague, Gimpel and
Colepaugh returned to Germany where they were educated in
photography--how best to use their Leica cameras and how to
develop and print the pictures they took.

They also studied

how to reduce their negatives to microdots that could be
hidden on any letter or envelope, and read only under a
microscope. (20)
It was during the photography training that Colepaugh
was told that he and Gimpel would be sent to the United
States to gather information from American magazines,
newspapers, books, and radio regarding airplanes, shipping,
and rocket production.

The two men were told to pay

particular attention to anything in the engineering
field. (21)

Gimpel was instructed to build a radio by which

all vital intelligence was to be sent to Germany.

The code

for sending radio messages was based on the advertising
slogan on the Lucky Strike Cigarette package: "Lucky Strike
Cigarettes--It's Toasted."(22)

Mail drops in Lisbon and

Madrid were to be used for the less essential material.

In

addition the men were provided with the names and
whereabouts of twenty American prisoners-of-war in Germany.
If Colepaugh or Gimpel needed to get in touch with Berlin,
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they were to address the letter to one of the prisoners,
using invisible ink for the important message.

These

letters would be intercepted by German authorities and
forwarded to RSHA VI. (23)
Both men were issued false papers, Colepaugh's in the
name of "William

c.

Caldwell," and Gimpel's made out to

"Edward George Green."

Colepaugh received a birth

certificate, a Selective Service registration card, a
Selective Service classification card, discharge papers from
the United States Navy, and a driver's license from
Massachusetts.

Gimpel's papers were substantially the same.

They also received duplicate papers that they could fill out
themselves if necessary.

The mission was to last two years

and some of the forms were predated for 1946. (24)
Gimpel and Colepaugh were given $60,000 in American
currency for their two year mission.

Colepaugh had told the

Germans that the cost of living in the United States had
taken a "sharp turn upwards," and that a single man needed
$15,000 a year to live on. (25)

Gimpel was also given

approximately one hundred small diamonds to be used if they
ran out of money, or if the currency given to them was no
longer in use. (26)
Colepaugh and Gimpel left Kiel harbor on board the
U-1230 in early October, 1944.

They landed at Frenchman

Bay, Maine, on November 29, 1944, and were in New York City
by December 1, too late to make any judgements on the effect
of German propaganda on the American presidential election.
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Once in New York City, the two German agents looked for an
apartment in a building that was constructed without steel,
where they could operate their short-wave radio.

A suitable

headquarters was found by December 8, and radio parts were
purchased for Gimpel to begin construction on a
transmitter-receiver unit.

The rest of the time they spent

living it up in New York City on the RSHA's money.

The

Christmas season in New York provided a host of
entertainments and neither of the two men seemed anxious to
begin spying. (27)
Though Schellenberg had tried to take every precaution
in organizing his first espionage operation to the United
States, there occurred events that were simply beyond his
control.

On December 3, the British freighter "Cornwallis"

was torpedoed off of Bar Harbor, Maine, just a few miles
away from Frenchman Bay.

The FBI was alerted since this

sinking signified the presence of an enemy submarine close
to the Maine coast and the possibility that it may have
landed enemy agents. (28)

During the FBI interviews of area

inhabitants, Harvard Hodgkins, the son of a Deputy Sheriff,
reported seeing two men walking away from the beach in the
vicinity of Frenchman Bay on November 29.

Hodgkins had told

his father about the two men, but their subsequent
investigation of the road and the beach turned up
nothing. (29)

Another resident of the area had seen two men

about a mile from where Hodgkins reported his sighting.
FBI found nothing on the beach but were able to determine

The
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that the two men did not ride the bus, make any long
distance calls, or buy train tickets in the area.
Unbeknownst to the FBI, Gimpel and Colepaugh had stumbled
across a taxi and had hired it for the ride into Bangor,
Maine. (30)
The sinking of the British ship and the warning it
provided to the FBI was an incident Schellenberg could not
have foreseen, but he was reasonably confident in Paeffgen's
ability to predict the actions of the men the leader of
Group D had recruited for the mission to the United States.
Unfortunately for Paeffgen and Schellenberg, their mission
experienced the same sort of failure as the Abwehr mission
of 1942.

The flaw was William Colepaugh.

During the waging of the last German offensive of the
war--the Battle of the Bulge--Colepaugh decided to walk out
on Erich Gimpel, taking their cumulative cash with him.

It

is not clear why Colepaugh left, nor whether his intention
was to turn himself in to the authorities.

For whatever the

reason, on December 21, Colepaugh left Gimpel at a men's
clothing store, took the suitcase containing the money and
his own traveling bag (both of which Gimpel had the keys
for) to the baggage room at Grand Central Station.

He

checked in at the expensive St. Moritz Hotel on Central Park
South for two days and continued to live it up in the city.
On December 23, Colepaugh went to see Edmund Mulcahy, an old
friend from school, and confessed his entire story, showing
the false identification papers and the large amount of
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money as proof. (31)

Colepaugh and Mulcahy spent the next

few days together and discussed informing the authorities.
Finally on December 26, Mulcahy called the FBI and arranged
for a special agent to come to his house and hear
Colepaugh's story.

Colepaugh was taken into custody and the

hunt for Gimpel began. (32)
Gimpel retrieved the suitcases Colepaugh left at Grand
Central Station by first claiming he had lost the claim
tickets and then producing the keys for the bags.

Gimpel

guessed correctly that Colepaugh would probably stay in New
York and enjoy the night life before leaving the city, and
would not want to carry around suitcases that he could not
easily open. (33)
Gimpel left the apartment he had shared with Colepaugh
and moved twice to different hotels.

In the meantime FBI

agents were combing the city armed with an accurate
description of Gimpel supplied by Colepaugh.

Gimpel was

picked up by agents of the FBI on December 30, 1944, at a
newsstand in Times Square. (34)
Erich Gimpel and William Colepaugh were charged with
violation of the 82nd Article of War--spying--and
conspiracy.

Their trial by Military Commission began on

February 6, 1945, at Governor's Island, New York.

On

February 14, the Commission found both men guilty and
sentenced them to death by hanging.

President Truman later

commuted their sentences to life imprisonment. (35)
When Gimpel and Colepaugh came ashore at Frenchman Bay
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on November 29, 1944, they entered a country that was in
profound contrast to Nazi Germany, a country whose
inhabitants felt their war was all but won.

In America

there were no bombed-out cities, no real austerity, and
nothing like the SS or Gestapo that dominated German life.
True, rationing was a part of the war years in United
States, but the country was well-off by German standards,
and was reveling in the success of the war effort, of which
the entire nation felt it shared a part.

Though many

experienced losses, the country as a whole celebrated the
Allied push at Normandy in June, 1944, and the liberation of
Rome and Paris in June and August.
The Russians were racing through eastern Europe, and
in October, 1944, captured Belgrade in Yugoslavia.

The only

surprise was the Battle of the Bulge in December, and
American troops at Bastogne stopped this last German
offensive.

The war in the Pacific was also going well for

the United States.
1944.

New Guinea was conquered in September,

In the Battle of Leyte Gulf in October, the Japanese

fleet was virtually wiped out by the U.S. Navy, and by
February 23, 1945, the liberation of the Philippines was
complete.
Consequently, much of the fear that had been generated
by the threat of German spies and saboteurs prior to the war
was absent in the winter of 1944-45, though up through the
war's end and even after, the American people retained the
strongly reinforced image of the merciless, monocled
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Prussian, and the diabolical, completely bad Nazi as a
threat to the free world.

Spy hysteria most assuredly waxed

and waned in direct relation to America's conduct and
success in the war, though by late 1944 Americans were no
doubt more vigilant about enemy spies.

A good example of

this was the conduct of Harvard Hodgkins who spotted Gimpel
and Colepaugh walking up from the beach in the early morning
of November, 29.

After passing the men on the highway he

followed their footprints in the snow down to the shore,
aware of the concern about spies landing on the coast.
Later he was able to impart this information to the FBI. (36)
In fact, shortly after the arrest of Gimpel and Colepaugh,

J. Edgar Hoover recognized Hodgkins' action and stated:
The only way that the agencies charged with the
internal security of this country can cope with the
problem is to ask for the cooperation of every loyal
American in reporting any suspicious characters to
the FBI. (37)
The responsibility of coordinating the fight against
enemy espionage rested with the FBI, and it is true that the
Bureau worked hard correlating information against those
reported to be disloyal to the United States, and searching
out those "enemies of democracy."

The Bureau's director was

anxious that the FBI retain its paramount position as
America's chief spy catcher.

After the capture of Gimpel

and Colepaugh, Hoover cautioned Americans to be ever on the
alert:
A great many persons have the idea that the war is
over and that now we can let down the bars. This
case and some other recent matters should dispel
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that idea.
It is very clear that the German
government is carrying on an intensive program of
training espionage and sabotage agents and sending
them into the Western Hemisphere.
The German
government at least, does not think the end of the
war is near. (38)
However, by this last winter of the war, the danger of
enemy infiltration seemed to have passed, or was at least
more readily accepted and thus easier to handle and
eliminate.

The "salad" days enjoyed by the Abwehr's agents

for a short time in the late 1930's were never to be
repeated, probably due more to the quality of agents the
German intelligence service recruited than to the vigilance
of the FBI.

It is certain that Nazi Germany underestimated

the United States militarily and did itself great damage.
It is easier to understand then, that the Third Reich's
leaders possibly overestimated the capabilities and skill of
the agents selected to work against the United States, and
at the same time underrated the American security organs.
Thus German agents sent to the United States after December,
1941, were never able to gain a substantial footing.
Schellenberg and Paeffgen had hoped to avoid the sort
of disasters that had befallen the Abwehr's team of
saboteurs in 1942, but they did not.

Despite all of the

intense checking the RSHA did on William Colepaugh and the
precautions they took against his being a double agent,
Colepaugh duplicated George Dasch's actions of 1942 and
betrayed the operation to the FBI.

Consequently the mission

that had involved so much preparation, materials, and money
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while the Third Reich struggled through the last months of
the war in the end accomplished nothing.
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CHAPTER IX
RESPICE FINEM
In his final testament, Adolf Hitler wrote, "The war
with America is a tragedy; illogical, devoid of fundamental
reality."(1)

Indeed, the entire German campaign against the

United States was a tragedy--for the Third Reich.

It

reflected an almost nearsighted determination on the part of
Adolf Hitler to ignore America as a world power, and the
prospect and impact of American intervention on behalf of
the Allies.

Hitler disregarded the lessons of 1917, and

through December, 1941, maintained his antagonistic attitude
toward the United States, while appearing indifferent to
America's power, its hostility to the Third Reich, and its
growing attachment to the Allies.
In 1941, Germany's war expanded from its fight against
lonely Britain to the invasion of the Soviet Union, and
finally to its declaration of war on the United States on
December 11, 1941.

The Third Reich went from an offensive

war which it largely controlled, to tactics that pitted it
against two of the largest and most powerful countries in
the world.

Hitler's ideology however, allowed him to

maintain an unrealistic belief that Germany's purity and
innate supremacy would ultimately triumph over the combined
forces of his enemies.
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Hitler alone was supreme in the Third Reich,
controlling the state, the government, the party and the
armed forces.

His power was dictatorial, and he was

extremely jealous of the authority he held.

Power and

influence in Nazi Germany was gained by seeking Hitler's
favor, encouraging intrigue and rivalry between individuals
and organizations.

Intelligence work suffered from the

competition for power generated between agencies.
or department had the full support of its peers.

No agency
Hitler was

the final arbiter in the use or disposal of material
gathered by the intelligence groups.

His view of America as

being inconsequential to the war in Europe contributed to
the inefficient espionage and sabotage campaigns in the
United States.
The Abwehr--Germany's military intelligence organ, and
the off ice most involved in espionage against the United
States--had to struggle for its very existence within
Hitler's Germany.

In addition, despite the fact that it was

engaged in gathering intelligence from the United States
from a relatively early time in the Third Reich's history,
information obtained by the Abwehr did not influence Hitler,
nor did his plans hinge on what the Abwehr learned.
Hitler's designs for Germany were firmly founded in
his own ideology, one of the main points being acquisition
of land in Eastern Europe as a solution to the problem of
German living space, or "Lebensraum."

Hitler's foreign

policy reflected an obsession with Eastern "Lebensraum,"
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observable in the annexation or "Anschluss" of Austria, the
takeover of Czechoslovakia, the invasion of Poland, and of
the Soviet Union.

Each step he took was part of a

calculated plan to expand the Reich eastward, often at the
expense of all other considerations.

Throughout the Reich's

years of peace and the early years of war, Hitler's
offensive policies proved successful.

With these initial

conquests following his schedule, Hitler felt foreign
intelligence was superfluous, and had no need of the
knowledge collected by his various espionage groups.

As

David Kahn, author of Hitler's Spies, said of the Fuhrer:
"He intended to impose his will on other countries.
fate would lie in his hands.

Their

For this he needed no

intelligence."(2)
Hitler disregarded or ignored any contradictions of
his beliefs or interference in his plans.

The Abwehr's work

in America and the results produced did not, and would not
have, dissuaded Hitler from his goals, nor would it have
changed what he felt were his intuitive truths.

Hitler

claimed the United States was weak, calling it "a feeble
country with a loud mouth."(3)

He underestimated its

military potential, and stressed American isolationism,
social division, economic problems, and "racial decay" in
order to discount a strong American role in Europe.

In

1938, Hitler replied to a question regarding the effect of
American intervention in a European war with the statement
that, the United States was incapable of conducting war. (4)
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Hitler was convinced that America was an inferior country;
an unrealistic belief, but one suited to his purpose.

It

left him free to deal with the problem of "Lebensraum" and
the Reich's march east.
Hitler's world was central Europe, and it cannot be
emphasized enough that areas outside his world were
essentially outside his scope of interest and concern.
America was one of those nations that was of no vital
importance to Hitler.

That is not to say that the whole of

Germany felt America was weak and of little consequence.

On

the contrary, German diplomats in the United States
consistently warned the Reich's political leadership of
American hostility toward Germany's domestic and foreign
policies, while emphasizing America's industry, its
potential military strength, and its close ties with
Britain.

However, these cautious truths made little

impression on Hitler and those close to him.

This failure

on the part of Germany's leaders, particularly Adolf Hitler,
to properly evaluate and use information from the United
States hampered the German intelligence system.

It is not

unlikely then that these general beliefs held by the Fuhrer
regarding the United States trickled down through the
structure of the Third Reich and its people, including
perhaps, its intelligence organizations.

The Abwehr had to

have been exposed to these arrogant distortions of Hitler's,
and the RSHA certainly was.
Naturally the Abwehr was interested in information
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from the United States, but its methods and operations were
often conducted in clear defiance of the American security
system.

In the spring of 1941, Hitler was spouting rhetoric

that affirmed a German-American conflict would find Germany
" •.• vastly superior, and that quite apart from the fact that
the German soldier naturally ranks high above the
Americans."(5)

In a similar vein, many Abwehr agents and

their spymasters felt espionage activities in the United
States could be conducted safely and with little
interference from "those stupid Americans."(6)
The accomplishments of Germany's agents in America did
not live up to expectations of the spymasters in the Third
Reich, nor did the information ferreted out by these agents
affect the final outcome of the war.

The Abwehr enjoyed

some success in its early years in America, but by and large
the Abwehr was forced to deal with a number of abortive and
unsuccessful missions, and caused by agents who were
singularly unequipped for intelligence work.

When the Nazi

Party in the form of the RSHA took over German foreign
intelligence and worked against America the results were the
same.
Competition and rivalry between agencies within the
Third Reich, the Abwehr's own internal problems and diverse
loyalties, the fact that military intelligence was not at
first a priority for the Third Reich's leaders, and the
underestimation of the United States, made the Abwehr lax
and sometimes caused distortions in its intelligence; thus
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its espionage work in America suffered.

This is clearly

indicated by the caliber of a number of the agents engaged
for espionage work against the United States: Guenther
Rumrich, the consummate failure who joined the Abwehr via a
letter and an ad in the New York Times, who was caught
because of a foolish error and promptly informed on everyone
he knew: George Dasch, the waiter selected for a sabotage
mission, who betrayed his co-agents and their assignment in
the hopes of becoming an American hero: William Colepaugh,
the disgruntled American who thought it would be fun to spy
for Germany, who energetically spent more than $400 a week
of the RSHA's funds, and after less than a month in the
United States, turned himself and his partner in to the
FBI. (7)

And finally, in the epitome of poor screening, the

Abwehr's enlistment of William Sebold as a spy, whose
clandestine work for the FBI coupled with the lack of
security precautions on the part of the German agents
working in the United States, led to the largest number of
mass arrests of alien spies in American history.
Obviously the choice of these men as agents was not
successful for German intelligence in the long run: instead
their selection proved self-defeating, for first the Abwehr
and later the RSHA.

Additionally, their performance did

little to fit Hitler's much touted view of Aryan supremacy,
or his belief in the unwavering loyalty and sense of duty
imbued in those of German blood.

Thus many of those

enlisted by German intelligence for espionage work against
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the United States were probably the least qualified, or the
least likely, to serve as spies.
From the beginning, National Socialist Germany and the
United States were separated by a wide ideological gulf, and
neither country's inhabitants were especially reticent about
expressing their views about each other.
example, was always very clear.

Hitler, for

To him the United States

was:
•.. a decayed country, with problems of race and
social inequality, of no ideas ..•. My feelings
against America are those of hatred and repugnance;
half Judaized, half negrified with everything built
on the dollar. (8)
According to Hitler, Americans had "the brains of a hen,"
and the country itself was "a Jewish rubbish heap."(9)
The Americans were equally blunt.

Anti-Nazi

demonstrations in the United States were mentioned regularly
in dispatches from the German embassy in Washington to
Berlin, beginning shortly after the installation of Hitler
as Chancellor in January, 1933.

By March, Ambassador

Prittwitz reported on the already unfavorable reaction in the
United States toward National Socialism. (10)

Outbursts

ranged from protests against German anti-Semitism to a mock
murder trial of Hitler in New York City. (11)
After 1938, most of America's hostility was directed
toward what was viewed as Germany's aggressive foreign
policy.

In the United States, Germany was seen as the moral

enemy, ideologically at odds with American principles,
intent on ultimately conquering the world.

This view was
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reinforced by a number of America's governmental and
political leaders.

Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau and

Interior Secretary Harold Ickes were noted for their
anti-German feelings and statements, and Secretary of War
Henry Stimson and Secretary of Navy Frank Knox were avowed
interventionists. (12)

In 1940, President Roosevelt stated

that Hitler and Germany aimed at "the complete domination of
the world."(13)

Secretary of State Cordell Hull described

Hitler in late 1941 as:
The most devastating and all-pervading conqueror
and destroyer in the last thousand years and we
believe there is no geographical limit whatsoever to
his infamous plans. (14)
These views, accompanied by a certain amount of effective
exaggeration, were passed on through the media to the
American public who, in general, came to share these same
opinions.
Almost from its inception as the reigning power in
Germany, National Socialism was perceived by many Americans
as a threat to the United States.

Germany was the adhesive

that bound the Axis together, ties which automatically put
the anti-fascist countries of the world--the United States
included--on the defensive.

As the Third Reich maintained

its aggressive policies, many Americans began to visualize a
dividing line between themselves and the Nazis, which not
only differentiated between their ideologies, but also
emphasized what were seen as moral dif ferences--good and
evil, freedom and slavery, democracy and fascism.

It

165
naturally followed that Americans, for the most part, were
adamantly against the importation of National Socialism to
the United States, though the country had its share of
pro-Nazi groups.

High-visibility organizations like the

German-American Bund, taken in the same context as
statements by Hitler and others which stressed the
international solidarity and innate loyalty to the Reich of
those of German blood, violated American sensitivities
toward foreign ties and contributed to the fear of fifth
column activities.
Though the United States had maintained a policy of
isolationism after the First World War, Americans found that
their self-imposed quarantine did not render their country
inviolate from the activities of German espionage agents.
The first arrests of Nazi spies in the United States in 1938
illuminated this most clearly.

Americans had determined

that their country would remain apart from the problems of
Europe and the rest of the world, but naturally the Abwehr
did not recognize this position and showed no compunction in
its attempts to delve into America's secrets.

Thus the

involvement of the Abwehr in America and its justifiable
refusal to acknowledge American "isolationism," brought the
United States closer in principle and position to other
potential enemies of Germany, and accelerated America's
progress away from its self-imposed segregation.
The arrest of Guenther Rumrich in 1938 was the first
outward manifestation of Nazi aggression directed toward the
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United States.

It was at this point that all the fears

harbored by Americans for the Nazis seemed justified.

The

fact that espionage agents were sent to the United States
seemed proof enough of the Third Reich's intentions.
Suddenly Nazi spies seemed to be everywhere; sent to weaken
America, to steal its secrets, to sabotage its industry, to
topple the country from the inside.
apparently enormous.

And their numbers were

For every spy arrested, Americans were

told there were hundreds, even thousands more still at
large.
In 1941, the American public was again apprised of the
presence of German espionage agents in their midst.

This

time more than forty individuals involved in two spy rings
were arrested by the FBI.
the war years.

Fear of sabotage increased during

In 1942 and 1944, in two different

operations, the Nazis landed agents on America's eastern
coast in an attempt to infiltrate spies and saboteurs into
the population.

Both missions were ultimately exposed from

within.
In each of the spy cases described, publicity and
media coverage were very strong, exceeding by far the actual
importance and success of the individuals involved.

In the

late 1930's and the early 1940's, the views of President
Roosevelt's administration and the American public regarding
German National Socialism were amplified through the media,
and after the detection of the first German spies, publicity
exaggerated the skills and numbers attributed to the network

167
of German espionage agents in the United States.

This, in

turn, led to unrealistic fears regarding German espionage in
America, which translated into hysterical calls to the FBI
describing German spies communicating through the water
faucets, putting ground glass into food, parachuting into
the hills, or sending cryptic messages all over the country
by means of flashing lights. (15)
The American public was swayed by their conceptions of
the Nazis and what was believed to be the Nazi plan for the
United States.

While the spies arrested were often

prejudiciously portrayed due to their "fascist" beliefs and
their results belittled, there remained the fear among
Americans of those German spies who had not yet been caught.
These undetected agents were those who generated the most
apprehension throughout the country.

They were the ones who

would start the fires, poison the water supplies,
disseminate disease cultures and germs in populated areas,
and blow up vital transportation centers.
Unfortunately, most Americans were not informed of the
ratio of success to failure for German spies and saboteurs
in the United States between 1935 and 1945.

Essentially,

they knew only that agents of the Third Reich had been
caught, and that each patriotic American had to be
constantly on the defensive to guard against the insidious
German spy.

Of course this belief was strengthened by what

the average American read and watched in films, and was
mitigated slightly only in the last months of the war when
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victory was in sight.
The accomplishments of German espionage agents in
America did not merit such fears; Americans themselves
exaggerated the success and stature of the German spy, an
image unfortunately reinforced somewhat by the media, and by
the government.

In the Third Reich, the value of gathered

intelligence was determined by how the information was
evaluated.

Ironically enough, vital intelligence could be

lost or disregarded if improperly judged.

In the same vein,

it could be said that what was perceived as the success of
German spying in America was determined less by the concrete
achievements of the agents than by how the entire espionage
threat was evaluated by the American people.

In the end,

like Hitler, the Abwehr, and the RSHA, the American public
became the victims of their own distortions and
misconceptions.
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